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This dissertation contains two independent and self contained essays in
monetary economics.
Chapter 1: "The New Keynesian Model and The Term Structure of In-
terest Rates"
The first essay studies the ability of a standard New Keynesian model to
reproduce the behavior of the term structure of interest rates for the U.S.
economy. The model is consistent with important features of the data. The
version of the expectations hypothesis embodied in the model does a good
job in explaining the patterns of correlations between nominal interest rates
of various maturities. Other aspects, such as the volatility of, both nominal
and real, long-term interest rates as well as the correlations between nominal
interest rates and output, are not appropriately captured by the model.
Chapter 2: "Should Monetary Policy Use Long-Term Rates'?"
The second essay studies two roles that long-term nominal interest rates
can play in the conduct of monetary policy in a New Keynesian model. The
first role allows long-term rates to enter the reaction function of the monetary
authority. The second role considers the possibility of using long-term rates
as instruments of policy. It is shown that in both cases a unique rational
expectations equilibrium exists. Reacting to movements in long yields does
not improve macroeconomic performance as measured by the loss function.
However, long-term rates turn out to be better instruments when the relative
concern of the monetary authority for inflation volatility is high.
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Chapter 1
The New Keynesian Model and
The Term Structure of Interest
Rates
1.1 Introduction
In recent years the New Keynesian model has emerged as an engine of analysis for
the study of macroeconomic fluctuations. The model manifests a certain degree of
agreement in macroeconomics. In fact, Goodfriend and King (1997) refer to those
areas of agreement as the New Neoclassical Synthesis. This new synthesis combines
intertemporal optimization techniques and rational expectations with an institutional
environment characterized by the existence of nominal frictions (e.g. sticky prices)
and imperfect competition in the goods market. The presence of price stickiness
makes the model suitable for the study of monetary policy, since changes in nominal
variables translate into changes in real variables in the short-run. In other words, in
the short-run the model displays nonneutrality with respect to changes in the quantity
of money, since prices do not adjust immediately, but it exhibits monetary neutrality
in the long-run once all prices have adjusted. While the New Keynesian model has
been extensively used to study the role of optimal monetary policy and the role of
different interest rate rules, and although it has been tested in various dimensions of
the data, surprisingly, the model's implications with respect to the term structure of
interest rates have not yet been addressed. This paper then asks the following: To
what extent can a standard New Keynesian model capture the behavior of the term
structure of interest rates for the U.S. economy?
The exercise conducted in this paper is similar in spirit to that of Evans and
Marshall (1998). However, some important differences are worth mentioning. Evans
and Marshall document the empirical patterns of the term structure of interest rates
after a shock to the Federal Funds rate and then explore whether a Limited Partici-
pation model can replicate these findings. Unlike the New Keynesian model in which
the form of nominal friction is the sluggish behavior of the price index of goods, the
nominal rigidity in Limited Participation models is that households must decide how
much cash to use in the goods market prior to the realization of the monetary in-
novation. In addition, it is assumed that cash balances set aside for the purchase of
goods cannot be adjusted without a cost. This adjustment cost permits real effects
of a monetary-policy shock to propagate in time. Their model also assumes that
firms face a cash-in-advance constraint evident by the need to finance the wage bill in
advance of production. As a result, firms need to borrow from the financial intermedi-
ary at the interest rate set by the monetary authority. Since the one-period nominal
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interest rate is directly linked to labor market conditions, the monetary authority
has an additional leverage over real output not present in standard New Keynesian
models.
While there is nothing unappealing about the assumptions set forth with respect
to the effects of monetary-policy shocks in Limited Participation models, it remains
important to study the ability of a 'more conventional' monetary transmission mech-
anism to replicate these empirical patterns. By a conventional mechanism I mean one
in which the monetary authority controls a short-term nominal interest rate while
aggregate demand is influenced by movements in a long-term real interest rate. The
New Keynesian model possesses exactly this kind of transmission mechanism. In the
model the monetary authority has leverage over longer-term nominal interest rates
since the expectations hypothesis of the term structure holds true. Thus, the market
determines nominal long-term rates as the average expected level of short term nom-
ina! rates over the maturity horizon under consideration. In addition, movements in
nominal interest rates bring about changes in real rates due to the presence of price
rigidities. As stressed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), it is the long-term real
interest rate that matters for aggregate demand in sticky price models.1
IThis is a partial description of the monetary transmission mechanism in a standard New Key-
nesian model with a Taylor-type interest rate rule since changes in real variables (output) also affect
the determination of the short-term nominal interest rate. In addition, the discussion up to now
has only explained how movements in a long-real interest rate affects aggregate demand but not the
equilibrium level of output. It is important to note at this point the combined power that monopo-
listic competition and price stickiness have for the effect of movements in money on output. To see
this clearly, think of the perfect competition case. If demand rises, but prices remains at the same
level (due to some friction), firms will not respond by increasing quantities, but will produce the
same amount. Firms respond only to movements in prices in a perfect competition world. However,
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In fact, one could argue that this exercise is more relevant for assessing the em-
pirical performance of the New Keynesian model, since this model places the term
structure of interest rates at the heart of the monetary transmission mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I reconstruct a standard
New Keynesian model. Then extend the set of equilibrium conditions to allow for
an explicit consideration of the term structure of interest rates. Section 3 discusses
the calibration of the model's parameters used to calculate llllconditional moments
and impulse response fllllctions. Section 4 presents compares empirical and theoret-
ical unconditional moments and discusses the empirical framework used to identify
monetary-policy innovations. Section 5 then compares the theoretical and empirical
impulse response functions for nominal and real interest rates of various maturities to
a contractionary monetary-policy innovation. Section 6 summarizes the main results
of the paper and concludes by suggesting potential avenues for future research.
in the proposed environment, if prices are fix at a level that exceeds marginal cost, then firms will
find it desirable to expand production when its demand rises. An excellent discussion is provided
by Goodfriend and King (1998).
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1.2 The Model
In this section I set up a standard New Keynesian model with capital and money-
in-the-utility-function. The economy is populated by three types of agents: infinitely
lived households, firms, and a monetary authority. The fact that households are
identical to each other in every respect together with the assumption that complete
insurance markets exist, allow us to concentrate on the behavior of a representative
one. They own the capital stock, labor inputs and firms, implying that rentals on
capital, wages and profits are paid to them.
The economy contains a continuum of differentiated goods that are produced by
firms operating in a monopolistically competitive market. These differentiated goods
are aggregated into a single composite good upon which consumption and savings
decisions are made. That is, the composite good can be used to either consume or
increase the capital stock.
The monetary authority's sole function is to control the money supply through
positive or negative transfers of money to households.
1.2.1 The Representative Household
The timing of events is as follows: the agent enters period t with a portfolio of zero-
coupon bonds of different maturities, {Bi,t-l}i=l , with prices at the beginning of
the period {qi-l,t}i=l , money balances M t- 1 , and capital K t- 1 , priced at Pt, carried
over from the previous period. According to this notation Bi,t denotes the number of
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nominal zero-coupon bonds at period t with i periods to maturity. A single bond Bi,t
promises to pay one dollar at the end of period t +i-I. The market price at t of such
a bond is denoted qi,t. Notice that the appropriate market price at the beginning of
t for a bond purchased in the previous period, Bi,t-l, is qi-l,t, since one period has
passed since the bond was originally purchased. During the period the agent receives
a transfer of money, H t , from the monetary authority as well as wages for WtLt, rentals
on capital for rtKt-l and profits for Qt, from the monopolistically competitive firms.
With the available funds the agent purchases a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds with
maturities ranging from 1 to n ,{Bi,t}i=l, with prices given by {qi,t}i::l. In addition the
agent decides on, money balances to be held and transferred to the next period, M t ,
purchases of new capital, for a nominal value of PtKt and consumption for PtCt. New
capital at t is available for production at t +1.2 It is assumed that capital depreciates
at a constant rate 6 , so that a fraction (1 - (5) is left at the end of the period. The
capital accumulation constraint is given by,
(1.1)
, where It stands for period's t gross investment. The period gross nominal return to
capital is then given by (rt+pt(I-<5)). It is further assumed that in order to transform
investment units of the composite good into new units of productive capital, the
2With respect to the timing of capital I stick to the following dating convention. If a variable is
chosen and / or (eventually) known at date t, it will be indexed with t.
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household must pay an adjustment cost, measured in terms of units of the composite
good and given by,
where the parameter ¢k governs the size of the capital adjustment cost and it is
assumed to be positive. As pointed out by Kimball (1995), King and Watson (1996)
and Kim (2000) the introduction of capital adjustment costs helps sticky-price models
match key features of the data.
Each period the household is subject to the constraint that the uses of funds are
not to exceed the sources of funds. The above assumptions imply that the flow budget
constraint expressed in real terms can be written as,
~ qi-l t Wt (rt ()) M t- 1L...JBi,t-l--' + -Lt + - + 1- b K t- 1 +--+
i=l Pt Pt Pt Pt
Q n ()2H t t qi t M t cPk K t+- + - 2: LBi,t-' + - +Ct+Kt + - -- -1 K t- 1
Pt Pt i=l Pt Pt 2 Kt- 1
(1.2)
The agent, therefore, chooses {Ct, L t , M t , {Bi,t}~l' Kt}~o to maximize its ex-
pected lifetime utility, given by
00 ( M L 1+TJ )Eo Lf3t InCt +,In _t _ 'IjJ_t-
t=O Pt 1 + 1J
(1.3)
subject to the constraints imposed by (1.1) and (1.2) for all t. The parameters in
(1.3) are restricted as follows: 0 < f3 < 1 , 'Y > 0 , 'IjJ > 0 and 1J > o.
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In addition to the dynamic programming problem, in each period, the agent solves
a static allocation problem in order to determine how much to purchase of each
differentiated good. As pointed out earlier the economy contains a continuum of
firms on the interval [0,1] which are indexed by z. Aggregate demand, yt , is defined
using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the following way,
[
1 ] e/{e-l)
yt = 1yt(z)(e-l)/edz
The price index associated with the single composite good is defined as follows,
[
1 ] l/{l-e)
Pt = 1Pt(z)l-edz (1.4)
As a result of expenditure minimization, when the price index for the composite
good is given by the expression above, the demand of firm z takes the following form,
1.2.2 Firms
yt(z) = (p~:») -e yt (1.5)
Firm z produces good z using capital and labor according to the following constant
returns to scale technology,
(1.6)
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Here at is an economy-wide technology shock which is assumed to follow the first
order autoregressive process shown below,
(1.7)
o< p < 1 ; E r'V N(O, a€)
Monopolistic competition in the goods market implies that factor demands are
obtained from cost minimization at a demand-determined level of output. It is as-
sumed here that factor markets are perfectly competitive and factor prices perfectly
flexible. These assumptions ensure that marginal cost, MGt, is independent of the
level of output3 . Hence, the firm's problem yields the cost minimization conditions
given by,
Tt yt(z)
- mCtaK ()Pt t-l z
Wt }t(z)
== mCt(l - a) Lt(z)Pt
(1.8)
(1.9)
where mCt(== MCt/pt) stands for real marginal cost at time t.
Equations (1.5),(1.8) and (A.9) can be combined to describe period's t real profit
3Notice that for a constant returns to scale production function we are allowed to write total
cost, TC, as TC = A(r, w)Y . It is clear that if all firms face the same set of prices (r, w), then they
will all have the same marginal cost (MC = A(r, w)) independently of their level of output.
ix
for firm z. If we denote nominal profit by Q(z), real profit can be written as,
Qt(Z) == (Pt(Z) _ met) (Pt(z)) -(; yt
Pt Pt Pt
(1.10)
Let us now consider the price decision of firms. Following Calvo (1983) I assume
that each period there is a constant probability (1 - <p) that the firm will be able
to adjust its price, independently of past history. Since the draw is independent of
history we do not need to keep track of firms changing prices. The opportunity to
adjust follows an exogenous Poisson process. The law of large numbers ensures that
on each period a fraction (1 - <p) of firms will reset the price. Denote the period's
t new price set by "lucky" firms by p~. The price index specified in equation (1.4)
together with the assumptions on how price setting opportunities arrive to firms,
imply the following law of motion,
_ [ 1-e + (1 _ )( n)1-e] 1/1-ePt - <PPt-1 <P Pt (1.11)
This assumed stickiness is taken to be an institutional fact, just like the available
production teclmology. The institutional constraints are taken into account by price
setters, in that they set prices in a forward looking manner, on the basis of expecta-
tions with respect to future demand and cost conditions. Since with a probability of
<pk the new price in period t, p~, will be charged in period t + k, lucky firms in period
t set the price as if they were to be stuck from then on with the same price. That is,
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lucky firm z sets p~ (z) by solving the problem below,
where J.tt is the marginal utility of wealth in period t. The first order condition of the
problem yields,
(1.12)
Since the lhs of equation (A.12) does not depend on firm's z particular conditions,
the optimal price p~(z) is the same for each lucky firm, and so in equilibrium, all
prices that are set in t are equal to the common price p~.
1.2.3 The Monetary Authority
Each period the monetary authority injects a quantity of money H t as a transfer to
households. The total quantity of money in the economy obeys,
If we let Wt == ~-1 stand for period's t gross growth rate of the money supply and
mt == M.i stand for real money balances at time t, then the evolution of real money
Pt
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balances can be described by,
(1.13)
where 1ft = ...l!L is the time t gross inflation rate.
Pt-l
It can be shown that the first order conditions for the household's problem can be
combined to obtain the money demand equation
(1.14)
where R1,t denotes the gross nominal one-period interest rate. The money market
equilibrium condition allows us to express the gross nominal one-period interest rate
as
The above expression shows explicitly that the monetary authority can set the short
term interest rate, R1,t, as long as Wt adjusts freely to satisfy the money market
conditions necessary to support a given short term interest rate.
It is assumed that the monetary authority conducts monetary policy by setting
the one-period nominal interest rate R1,t in response to changes in the previous period
level of output, in the previous period inflation rate and in the previous period short-
term nominal interest rate. Monetary policy is characterized by a commitment to the
following rule
(1.15)
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where bt is an i.i.d. shock with a normal distribution N(O, ab) and g(.) is in principle
some non-linear arbitrary reaction function. The log-linear version of equation (A.14)
is usually known as a Taylor rule with an interest rate smoothing term, due to the
fact that R1,t is set as a function of its own lagged value. This smoothing term implies
that persistent changes in output and inflation bring about only gradual movements
in the one-period nominal interest rate. Actual policy in the United States seems to
be characterized by such gradual behavior.4
1.2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is an allocation sequence
household maximization problem, the first order conditions from firm's cost min-
imization problem (equations (1.8) and (A.9)), the first order condition from the
firm's price setting problem (equation (A.12)), constraints (equations (1.2) and (A.8)),
market equilibrium conditions, the monetary policy rule (equation (A.14)) and the
assumed random processes in the economy for technology (equation (1.7)) and the
monetary shock. These equations form a nonlinear dynamic stochastic system of
equations. For the numerical study of the model, I rely on log-linear approximations
4As stressed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) improvements in household's welfare are
achieved relative to the case of simple Taylor-rules by allowing the funds rate to respond also to
lagged values of itself.
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to the model's structural equations. I assume an equilibrium in which the economy
stays near a steady state path. As usually done in the literature, the system is solved
by analyzing its log-linear representation around its steady state. For this purpose
I introduce the hat notation and allow Xt to denote the percentage deviation of X t
from its steady state value of X. (Le. Xt = log(Xt /X))5.
5In the case of the variables rt, Wt and Qt, they refer to In( r;~:t), In( w~~:t) and In( ~~~t) respec-
tively. That is, they stand for the % deviation of the real rental rate on capital, real wage and
real profit from their steady state values respectively.
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The log-linear version of the non-linear system of equations is given by
iA 1 A A"~,t = i Et (CHi - Ct + L..J 1ft+k) i = 1, ... , n
k=l
A (1 - <p)(1 - (3<p) A + (3E A
7ft = met t 7ft+l
<p
A CA KA KA
yt = yCt + yKt - (1- 8)yKt - 1
(1.16a)
(1.16b)
(1.16c)
(1.16d)
(1.16e)
(1.16£)
(1.16g)
(1.16h)
(1.16i)
(1.16j)
(1.16k)
(1.161)
(1.16m)
(1.16n)
Notice that (16c) embraces n distinct equations which determine the equilibrium
values of nominal interest rates for maturities 1 through n at time t. Viewed as a
function of i, equation (16c) represents the term structure of nominal interest rates
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or yield curve in period t. That is, the time t nominal yield curve could be viewed as
i4,t = Ft(i). Note that this function in any given period need not be same as in any
other period. In fact, the U.S. yield curve exhibits considerable variations in time.
Sometimes it is upward sloping, sometimes it is downward sloping and sometimes it
is hump shaped with intermediate maturity yields being the highest. A positively
sloped equilibrium term structure on a given period means that if the term structure
had been flat at a level such that it intersects the positively sloped equilibrium term
structure at maturity i*, then there would be an excess demand in all bond markets
for maturities less than i* and excess supply in bond markets for maturities greater
than i*. The positively sloped term structure then arises to remove these disequilibria.
Further notice that (16c) embodies the version of the expectation hypothesis of
the term structure that is build into the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model6• Hence, the model is suitable not only to study the relationship
between movements in various interest rates but it is also suitable to analyze the
relationship between movements in the yield curve and movements in other macro-
economic variables of interest like output and inflation. In other words, the full-blown
model as it stands becomes a theory about the simultaneous determination of the be-
havior of the yield curve and the behavior of output and inflation among many other
variables.
The methods described in Uhlig (2000) can be applied to the system of equa-
6A derivation of equation (16c) is provided in the appendix.
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tions described by (16a)-(16n) after choosing parameter values to produce a solution
recursive equilibrium law of motion of the form,
Xt = PXt-l + QZt
Yt Rxt- 1 + SZt
where Xt stands for the vector of endogenous state variables, Yt stands for the vector of
jump variables, Zt stands for the vector of exogenous stochastic processes and P, Q, R
and S are the solution matrices.
1.3 The Benchmark Calibration
In this section I discuss the benchmark calibration of the model. The model is cali-
brated at a monthly frequency since estimation is conducted at that frequency too.
The values of a (the share of capital), f3 (the monthly discount factor), 8 (the
monthly capital depreciation rate) and e (parameter that governs the degree of mo-
nopolistic competition) are standard choices. They are set as follows
a 0.33; f3 = 0.997
8 0.0083;e = 12
The monthly capital depreciation rate 8 is set so that the quarterly capital deprecia-
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tion rate is at 0.025, which is standard in the RBC literature as well as the value of
/3 which is set to match an annual steady state rate of interest of 4%. In the case of c
the value is set to yield a steady state markup of 10%. Some parameters deserve an
additional explanation in order to justify the chosen values. In the case of the para-
meter that determines the degree of price stickiness, <p, the value is chosen so that the
expected contract length is equal to twelve months. This implies a value of <p equal to
i~. The value of 'TJ is set to 0.6 as suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1988), to match microeconometric estimates of labor supply elasticities. The capital
adjustment cost parameter cPk is set in the following way: first a quarterly value of
12 is chosen following Ireland (1999) quite closely. Impulse response functions are
constructed at a quarterly frequency for both shocks in the model economy. I then
observe the number of quarters it takes for capital to adjust 75% of the way and set
the montWy analog through a trial and error procedure to match the timing patterns
of the montWy impulse response functions. This procedure yields a value for ¢k of
55.
With respect to the monetary policy rule parameters I have chosen aR equal to
0.8, a1(" equal to 0.24 and ay equal to 0.0004. These choices correspond to quarterly
values for aR, a 1r and ay of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.001 respectively. The monthly values are
set on the basis of matching long-run effects. The degree of persistence for technology
pa is set to 0.98 following Cooley and Prescott (1995). The standard deviation of the
technology and monetary shocks are set to 0.404 and 1 respectively, both expressed
xviii
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in percentage units. In the case of the first, the value is adjusted to satisfy a monthly
frequency following Prescott's (1986) quarterly estimates. The standard deviation
of the monetary shock is set according to the assumed value for the variance of the
monetary innovation in the structural vector autoregression. Finally, the parameter
that governs the size of the monetary shock, ab , is set to 0.0393. This value implies
that a one standard deviation increase in bt translates in a 50 basis points increase
of the one-period nominal interest rates in annual terms. As shown later, the data
reveals that a monetary shock increases on impact the Federal Funds rate by 50 basis
points too.7
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section I study two different questions. The first refers to the capacity of
the model economy to reproduce the moments generated by the data in relation to
nominal interest rates of distinct maturities, output and inflation. I look at unfiltered
moments and those that emerge at a business cycle frequency. This comparison is
important because it does not rely on identifying assumptions about the underlying
structural disturbances in the economy. When analyzing unconditional moments the
7For the purpose of studying the impulse response functions to a monetary shock, bt , the size
of the shock is reduced by Ctb so that the one-period nominal interest rate deviates 50 basis points
on annual terms from its steady state value. Notice that if R1,t represents a one-period interest
rate in monthly units, then Rl,t == (R1,t)12 expresses the same interest rate measured in annual
units. Hence R1,t = 1 implies that the resulting interest rate in annual terms is given by Rl,t = (R
exp(.01))12. The value of Ctb is set so that a one-standard deviation increase in bt causes Rl,t to
increase by approximately 50 basis points.
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channels by which shocks propagate throughout the economy do not need to be spec-
ified in advance. It could be argued, in the case of identifying shocks, that the theory
which we intend to test conditions the observations upon which the testing will rely
later on. At the same time, not as much understanding about the precise nature of the
dynamics of the economy can be gained by merely comparing theoretical to empirical
moments. For this reason I also look at the impulse response functions generated
by an identified VAR to the theoretical ones. Hence, the second question addresses
the extent to which the shape and magnitude of the model's impulse response func-
tions match the empirical ones obtained from identified vector autoregressions. The
impulse response analysis concentrates on the effects of a monetary innovation in
relation to nominal and real interest rates.8
The frequency of the data under consideration is monthly, running from 1963-1
to 2000-12. Following Evans and Marshall (1998) the data vector of macroeconomic
variables that I consider is
Z == (Em, P, Pearn, F F, NlJrITr, D.M2)'
where Em refers to the log of nonagricultural payroll employment, P refers to the
log of the personal consumption expenditures (POE) deflator in chain-weighted 1996
dollars, Pcom refers to the change in an index of sensitive materials published by the
8Evans and Marshall (1998) set up a model in which the only source of uncertainty comes from
monetary-policy shocks and do not perform an unconditional moments comparison. Only the results
of the impulse response analysis are comparable to theirs.
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Conference Board, F F is the federal fllllds rate, NbrITr refers to the ratio of non-
borrowed reserves to total reserves and ~M2 refers to the growth rate of M2. The
yields used here are the I-month, 3-month, I2-month, 24-month, 36-month, 48-month
and 60-month Fama and Bliss zero-coupon bond yields from the CRSP data.
1.4.1 Moments
Unfiltered Moments
Table 1 below displays in the upper table the standard deviations generated by the
model economy and those generated by the data. The middle table shows an index of
the volatility of interest rates of various maturities relative to that of the instrument
of monetary policy.9 This measure of relative volatility is simply calculated as the
ratio of the standard deviation of interest rate with maturity i with respect to the
standard deviation of the instrument of monetary policy.lo The lower table displays
the percentage change in the standard deviation as we move towards longer term
rates.
A few things are worth emphasizing. The data shows that the magnitude of the
standard deviation is inversely related to bond maturity. This pattern is satisfactorily
9Notice that the instrument of monetary policy in the model is R1,t , whereas in the data is taken
to be the Federal Funds rate (FF) and not the one-month nominal interest rate (R 1). I have chosen
not to report the empirical correlation with respect to R 1 in order to avoid potential confusion.
The criterium for comparison lies in the fact that R1,t in the model and F F in the data both play
the role of being the instrument of monetary policy.
lOThe empirical standard deviation are computed as follows: I translate all interest rates into
monthly units and calculate the log of their deviation from their mean. The standard deviation of
these series are in comparable units to those produced by the model.
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captured by the model. However, in general, the model overestimates the volatility
for short and medium term rates and underestimates that of longer-term rates. In
addition, the model overestimates the standard deviation of interest rates relative to
that of the monetary policy instrument in all cases except for the 60-month yield.
As it is revealed by the lower table, in general, the model produces a more rapidly
decreasing volatility pattern as maturity increases than that of the data. In the
model, moving towards longer terms, for maturities greater that 12 months, I find
that the standard deviation falls by approximately 6% as maturity increases by one
year. Empirically, the standard deviation falls by approximately 2% as maturity
increases by one year.
Table 2 below shows the contemporaneous correlations of nominal interest rates
of various maturities, output and inflation provided both by the model's economy
benchmark calibration and the data. All empirical correlations shown throughout
the paper are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. It can be seen that
the model does a fairly good job at matching both the contemporaneous correlation
patterns for interest rates as well as the corresponding magnitudes. Notice that
the further apart interest rates are, in terms of maturity, from the monetary policy
instrument the lower the correlation is , both in the data and in the model. The
data shows that the contemporaneous correlation of the Federal Funds rate with the
3-month nominal interest rate is .97, decreasing all the way to .85 in the case of
the 5-year nominal interest rate. The model-generated correlations for interest rates
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display a similar pattern. Thus, the expectations hypothesis at work in the model
constitutes a good approximation to these observed empirical patterns. Note that
the instrument of monetary policy in the model R1,t shows a correlation of near unity
with the 3-months note and one of .96 with 5-year note. Figure 1 shows the precise
extent to which the model matches these observed empirical patterns. It can be seen
that the model overestimates this correlation as maturity increases.
The model is however incapable of reproducing the contemporaneous correlations
between output and interest rates observed in the data. Empirically, output is pos-
itively correlated with all nominal interest rates and more strongly so with interest
rates of longer maturities.11 This correlation increases monotonically with maturity.
On the other hand, the benchmark calibration of the model produces strong and
negative correlations for output and all interest rates under consideration. The com-
parable theoretical correlations are strong and negative increasing in absolute value
as maturity increases. I investigate the possibility that this failure of the model could
be induced by too low a concern for output deviations by the monetary authority.
Hence, I have also conducted the theoretical calculations with a bigger concern by
the monetary authority for output deviations (ay == 0.8 and ay == 1.0). As expected,
the correlations between output and nominal interest rates increase but remain to be
negative. For example, by increasing ay all the way to 1, I find that the correlation
11 I also looked at the contemporaneous correlations between nominal interest rates and indus-
trial production as an alternative measure of real economic activity. Those correlations are also
significantly positive but smaller.
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between output and the one-period nominal interest rate increases from the bench-
mark value of -.98 to -.37. The same correlation with the 60-month nominal rate
jumps from -.99 to -.22. Although these unfiltered correlations are sensitive to the
parameterization of the Taylor-rule, unreasonably high values of Qy would seem to be
required to explain the procyclicality of nominal interest rates through this channel.
In addition, I have also considered the case in which the standard deviation of the
monetary shock is set to zero (i.e. O"b == 0), and the model's only source of uncertainty
becomes the technology shock (at). Notice that a favorable technology innovation in
the model would drive inflation and output in different directions. Since the marginal
product of capital increases after a positive shock, and hence so does the rental rate
on capital, one could hypothesize that nominal interest rates would tend to move in
the same direction due to the absence of arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand,
the downward movement of inflation after a positive technology shock would tend to
decrease nominal interest rates through this channel. Therefore I have calculated the
implied correlations between output and nominal interest rates when O"b == 0 and I
have found that they remain virtually unaffected. Thus the benchmark calibrated
model with technology as the only source of uncertainty is unable to capture this
feature of the data. 12 In the case of inflation I consider the change in the log of the
personal consumption expenditures (peE) deflator in chain-weighted 1996 dollars as
12 Alternatively, the procyclicality of nominal interest rates could be caused by other types of
shocks that appear in the data but that are not present in the model. For example preference shocks
would move output and interest rates in the same direction.
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the measure for inflation.13 The empirical correlations between the change in the peE
deflator and interest rates are strong and positive. As it can be observed inflation
displays a correlation of .7 with the federal funds rate. This correlation decreases
smoothly as maturity increases, to .59 in the case of the 5-year yield. The model
generated moments show positive correlations between inflation and interest rates
of distinct maturities as well. However the theoretical correlations between inflation
and interest rates increase with maturity. As it can be seen in Table 2 the model
contemporaneous correlation between inflation and the one-period nominal interest
rate is .92 and the one with the 5-year nominal interest rate is .99.14
In addition, the data shows a negative contemporaneous correlation between in-
flation and output. The comparable theoretical correlation is also negative but much
stronger.
Next, I analyze the model's ability to match the first order autocorrelations shown
by the data. The model's first order autocorrelations are broadly consistent with the
sign patterns display by the data. Only the theoretical first order autocorrelations
between output and interest rates show a sign pattern which is at odds with the data.
The data shows that the Federal FUnds rate is positively and strongly correlated
13The VARs include the change in an index of sensitive materials as an alternative measure for
inflation. The reason why this measure is included is because it has been shown to mitigate strange
responses of the price index (price puzzle) to a monetary innovation. With respect to correlations I
chose the change in the PCE as the measure of inflation.
14Equation (161) in the model shows that the one-period nominal interest rate is set as a linear
function of the lagged values of output and inflation among other things. I have calculated the
correlations for an interest rate rule that sets the one-period nominal interest as a linear function of
the values of contemporaneous output and inflation and found that they remain virtually unaffected.
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with the one-period lagged Federal FUnds rate and the one-period lagged values of all
interest rates. This correlations diminish as maturity increases, from .98 in the Federal
FUnds rate own autocorrelation case to .85 in the case of the cross-correlation with
the lagged value of the 5-year note. Table 3 reveals that these features are fairly well
captured by the model generated moments. In the model the comparable correlations
also diminish as maturity increases, but only from .98 to .97. The calibrated model
looses fit as maturity increases in this respect.
As mentioned earlier, the calibrated model does not perform well in matching the
first order autocorrelation between output and interest rates in the sense that the
model ones are strongly negative whilst the empirical ones are positive. With respect
to inflation and lagged values of interest rates a similar match to the contemporaneous
correlation case is found. The empirical correlations between the change in the peE
deflator and interest rates are strongly positive. As shown, inflation displays a cor-
relation of .7 with the lagged federal funds rate. This correlation decreases smootWy
up to .57 in the case of the 5-year yield as maturity increases. The model-generated
moments show positive correlations between inflation and interest rates of distinct
maturities as well. However, as in the contemporaneous correlation case, the theoret-
ical first order autocorrelations between inflation and lagged interest rates increase
with maturity. The empirical and theoretical patterns between inflation and lagged
interest rates are shown in Figure 2.
xxvi
H-P Filtered Moments
In this subsection I reproduce the previous moments comparison but at a business
cycle frequency. For the purpose of filtering, I chose the Hodrick-Prescott filter with
A, the parameter that penalizes movements in the growth component of the series,
set equal to 14400 as suggested by Hodrick and Prescott for monthly data.
Table 4 reveals that the model underestimates the volatility of interest rates at a
business cycle frequency. Notice that in the top-panel the theoretical standard devia-
tion of Ri is approximately half that of its empirical counterpart. The medium-panel
shows the volatility of interest rates relative to that of the instrument of monetary
policy. Note that the pattern changes considerably with respect to the unfiltered case.
In this case, except for the 3-month yield, the model underestimates this measure of
relative volatility of nominal interest rates. In general, as it can be seen in the lower-
panel of Table 4, the model produces a more rapidly decreasing volatility pattern
when moving towards longer-term rates. Recall that this feature is also present in
the unfiltered case.
Table 5 shows the H-P filtered contemporaneous correlations between nominal
interest rates, output and inflation. Notice that relative to the unfiltered case, the
correlations between interest rates decrease more for short-term rates than what they
do for long-term rates. In fact, restricting attention to the correlations between in-
terest rates of maturity greater or equal than 24-month reveals that these values are
virtually unchanged when moving from the unfiltered case to the filtered case. Once
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again these empirical correlations are statistically significant at the 95% confidence
level. Notice that the magnitude of the correlations between interest rates of various
maturities and the instrument of monetary policy decrease at the business cycle fre-
quency both in the model and in the data. Recall that in the case of the comparable
unfiltered moments the model overestimates in general the magnitudes for interest
rates of all maturities. Interestingly, this aspect is not preserved in the filtered do-
main. As shown in Figure 3 the model overestimates the contemporaneous correlation
with the 3-month yield and underestimates the others. Just as before, note that the
further apart interest rates are, in terms of maturity, from the monetary policy in-
strument the lower the correlation is, both in the data and in the model. This feature
is preserved at a business cycle frequency. Once again, the expectations hypothesis
build into the New Keynesian model captures reasonably well the magnitudes and
patterns displayed by the data at a business cycle frequency.
The overall correlation patterns between interest rates is well approximated by
the model as revealed by Figure 3. Just as before, the model produces a negative
correlation between nominal interest rates and output while the filtered data display
positive ones. Notice that, in the data, at a business cycle frequency the procycli-
cality of nominal interest rates is accentuated. In fact, the filtered contemporaneous
correlation between the Federal Funds rate and output is .67 whereas the unfiltered
one is .092. And in the case of the 60-month yield the filtered correlation is .43 and
the 1lllfiltered one is .22. I once again explore the possibility that this failure of the
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model be caused by too low a concern for output deviations by the monetary au-
thority. As I pointed out earlier, in the unfiltered case the correlations induced by
an interest rate rule that sets the one-period nominal interest as a linear function
of the values of contemporaneous output and inflation remain virtually unaffected.
Surprisingly, the same is not true at a business cycle frequency. Table 6 shows that
the benchmark Taylor-rule in the model (RI,t ::= (XRRI,t-1 + a 7r-rrt-1 +ayit-I +ab bt ),
denoted "lagged Taylor-rule", is capable of generating a procyclical behavior of nomi-
nal interest rates for maturities greater or equal than one year and with ay set to 0.8.
In contrast, specifying the Taylor-rule with contemporaneous values of output and
inflation (RI,t ::= aRRI,t-l + a 7r-rrt +ayit + ab bt ) produces for ay ::= 0.8 a procyclical
behavior for all nominal interest rates. At the same time these higher values of ay
generate correlations between interest rates much higher than those displayed by the
data. In other words, by increasing the value of ay the model improves its ability to
explain the procyclicality of nominal rates but at the same time looses considerable
fit with respect to the joint movements of nominal interest rates.
Next, I analyze the model's capacity to match the filtered first order autocorrela-
tions observed in the data. As shown in Table 7 the model's first order autocorrelation
are broadly consistent with the sign patterns display by the data. The theoretical
first order aut0 correlations between output and interest rates show a sign pattern
which is at odds with the data as well as the ones between output and inflation.
The sign pattern in the top-panel of Table 7 remains unchanged relative to the llll-
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filtered case. However, the empirical first order autocorrelations between output and
inflation change sign. For example, the unfiltered first order autocorrelation between
output and lagged inflation is -.14 whereas for the filtered series this value becomes
.38. Thus, the model fails to capture this aspect at a business cycle frequency. In
addition, notice that the model does a surprisingly good job at matching the first
order autocorrelation pattern between nominal interest rates. This result suggests
that the expectations hypothesis build into the model becomes even more successful
at a business cycle frequency in explaining the persistence pattern between nominal
interest rates. This fact is illustrated in Figure 4, in which the empirical and theo-
retical first order autocorrelations between nominal interest rates and the one-period
lagged value of the monetary policy instrument are displayed.
1.4.2 Identified Vector Autoregressions
In this sub-section I follow Evans and Marshall (1998) quite closely.
In studying the effects of monetary innovations on the term structure of interest
rates through identified vector autoregressions I use a recursive identification strategy
introduced by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998). Following the work by
Evans and Marshall (1998) it is assumed that the instrument of monetary policy is
set by
(1.17)
where Ot stands for the information set available to the monetary authority at time
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t and f is some linear filllction that describes the monetary authority's systematic
reaction to the state of the economy. f~ is a monetary shock which can be interpreted
as the non-systematic components that influence monetary policy decisions.
Consider the following structural vector autoregression model,
a b
c 1 ~t,
==
A(L) B(L)
C(L) D(L)
Zt-l €zt
+0-
Ri,t-l fit
(1.18)
where Zt is the vector of macroeconomic variables at time t and ~,t denotes a bond
yield of maturity i months. Furthermore, a is a square matrix with ones on the
principal diagonal, b is colunm vector and c is a row vector, both of appropriate
dimensions. In addition we have that A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator,
C(L) is a row vector polynomial and B(L) is a column vector polynomial in the lag
operator while D (L) is a scalar polynomial in the lag operator. 0- is assumed to be
a diagonal matrix. It is assumed that €t =ref, f~]' is an i.i.d vector of mutually
and serially illlcorrelated structural shocks whose variance is the identity matrix.
Formally,
where k is the number of elements contained in Zt.
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Equation (1.17) corresponds to one row of the system described by (1.18). It is
further assumed that
b 0
B(L) = 0
These assumptions have the implication, as Evans and Marshall (1998) point out, that
neither contemporaneous nor lagged values of the bond yield enter the other equations
in the system. In addition, the shocks €of are invariant to bond maturity i. As Evans
and Marshall (1998) indicate the original papers that developed the approach used
here did not include bond yield data. However, they do not find that allowing for
B (L) =1= 0 changes significantly the empirical results. Notice that this assumption has
the implication of preserving the dynamic behavior of the vector of macroeconomic
variables, Zt, to the maturity bond yield in place. The exercise conducted here is
therefore comparable to previous related work.
Let us expand (1.18) in order to see how the assumptions of b = 0 and B(L) = 0
operate during estimation. Assume we start with an arbitrary number of lags, say p
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, then (1.18) is,
a b Zt Al B1 Zt-l A2 B2 Zt-2
+ + ...
c 1 ~t C1 D1 ~t-l C2 D2 ~,t-2, ,
A p B p Zt-p eZ
+0- t... +
Cp Dp Ri,t-p Eit
So notice that the assumption B(L) == 0 implies that B1 == B2 == ... == Bp == o. Since
B j is a k x 1 vector, for a vector autoregression of order p , B(L) == 0 imposes kp
restrictions on the underlying VAR.
Following Evans and Marshall (1998) I assume that (1.17) is given by,
(1.19)
Some important features of this identification strategy are worth mentioning.
Em, P and Pearn do not respond contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock.
On the other hand all of the other variables respond contemporaneously to a mone-
tary policy innovation. In addition, it is assumed that the monetary policy shock is
orthogonal to the variables that appear in the feedback rule. The economic meaning
of this assumption is that time t variables in the monetary authority's information
set do not respond to time t realizations of the monetary policy shock. While the
monetary authority looks at current prices and output when setting the federal funds
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rate, output and prices respond only with a one period lag to a monetary policy
innovation.
Let Z =(Em,P,Pcom,FF,NbrITr,jj.M2,~)' be the complete data vector.
That is, including the bond yield of maturity i. As discussed in Christiano Eichen-
baum and Evans (1998) I will analyze, for completeness, how the recursiveness as-
sumption restricts the matrix A defined below,
a b
c 1
For this purpose partition Zt into three blocks: the k1 variables X lt , whose contem-
poraneous values appear in nt, the k2 variables X 2t , which only appear with a lag in
Ot and the instrument of monetary policy, FFt itself. In the case under consideration
we have,
Xl == (Em, P, Pcom)'
X2 == (NbrITr, ilM2, ~)'
Hence kl = 3 and k2 = 3. The recursiveness assumption places the following zero
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restrictions on A,
8.11(kl Xkl) O(kl Xl) 0 (kl Xk2)
A== 8.21(IXkl) a22(lXl) O( lXk2)
a31(k2 Xkl) 8,32(k2 XI) a33(k2 Xk2)
Notice that the zeros in the middle row of A formalize the assumption that the
monetary authority does not see X 2 when setting its instrument, while the other two
blocks of zeros represent the assumption that Xl is not influenced contemporaneously
by the monetary policy shock. Note that the first block prevents the direct impact
and the second block the indirect impact of the monetary policy shock.
It is important to bear in mind that the recursiveness assumption is not sufficient
to identify all the elements of A. In fact the first kl equations are indistinguishable
from each other as well as the last k2 . Nevertheless the assumptions are sufficient to
identify the monetary policy shock. Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (1998) showed
that there is a set of matrices A that satisfy the recursiveness assumption and that
one element of this set has the property of being lower triangular with positive terms
on the main diagonal. In addition they showed that by adopting the normalization of
selecting this lower triangular matrix the dynamic responses of the variables in Zare
invariant to the ordering of variables in Xl and X2• However, the dynamic effect on
Zof the non-policy shocks is sensitive to the ordering. Without further identifying
restrictions, the non-monetary policy shocks and their implied dynamic responses
simply reflect normalizations done for convenience.
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1.4.3 EIllpirical IIllpulse Response Functions
The VARs were estimated over the sample period 1963-m9 to 2000-m12. Eight lagged
values were estimated in each equation with the initial lag starting in 1963-m1. The
nmnber of lags were chosen according to standard VAR order selection criteria.15
Figure 5 shows the responses of the vector of macroeconomic variables to a one
standard deviation contractionary monetary innovation over a 32 month horizon.
The impulse responses presented here are in general consistent with those presented
by Evans and Marshall (1998) except for a few details. As in their study the VAR here
produces a "price puzzle", albeit a stronger and more lasting one. Evans and Marshall
(1998) find that the P (PCE) response is negligibly positive for six month, while my
results suggest that the response is positive for at least twelve months. However,
inflation remains positive for six months after a shock. The rest of the variables'
responses are in agreement with macroeconomists' knowledge of what should occur
after a contractionary monetary policy shock. The response of Pcom ( the index of
sensitive materials prices) is negatively significant throughout but differs from that
presented by Evans and Marshall (1998) in terms of variability, displaying a bigger one
in my case. Like in Evans and Marshall (1998) the monetary contraction leads to a
47 basis points increase in the Federal Funds rate on impact. As it can be observed in
15For determining the number of lags to be included in the VAR I considered the likelihood ratio
test statistic (LR), Akaike's information criterion (AIC), the final prediction error criterion (FPE),
the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) and the Schwarz Bayesian Information criterion (SC). The LR statistic
yielded 12 lags, the Ale and FPE both agreed on 8 lags while HQ and SO yielded 2 lags. Given
this disagreement together with the fact that the limiting probability for both Ale and FPE of
overestimating the VAR order is negligible whenever the dimension of the data vector is greater or
equal to five, I haven chosen the lag order selected by those criteria.
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Figure 5, the Federal Funds rate rises to its maximum of 62 basis points in the second
month before declining from then on. The Federal Funds rate response is persistent
and transitory getting close to zero after 18 months. Surprisingly, the point estimate
of the impulse response for the Federal Funds rate becomes negative from month 22
and returns to zero from below. Em, the measure of output, remains fairly constant
for 4 months before decreasing persistently and reaching a minimum two years after
the shock. As Evans and Marshall (1998) point out, Em begins to fall before P does.
The same is true in the exercise done here. Thus, in general my results reinforce those
documented by Evans and Marshall (1998). Figure 6 shows the empirical responses of
bond yields to a one-standard deviation contractionary monetary policy innovation.
The responses displayed are measured in percentage points per aIlllUlli deviations from
the nonstochastic steady state. The bond maturities under consideration, as pointed
out earlier, are the I-month, 3-month, 12-month, 24-month, 36-month, 48-month and
60-month. In order to facilitate the comparison all graphs in Figure 6 are drawn
with the same vertical scale. It then becomes clear, by mere visual inspection, that
the initial effect on bond yields of a monetary innovation diminishes dramatically
as maturity increases. Notice that the monetary shock increases on impact the 1-
month nominal interest rate by 32 basis points, while the effect on the 12-month note
decreases to 22 basis points and that of the 60-month note is of approximately 7 basis
points. These initial responses are statistically significant in each case and larger for
shorter maturities. In the case of the Federal Funds rate the response vanishes after
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18 months whereas in the case of the 60-month yield the response approaches zero
after 24 months. Thus, relative to its initial effect the responses die off somewhat
slower for longer maturity rates.
Once again, these results are in general in accordance, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, with those presented by Evans and Marshall (1998).
1.5 Implications of the model
Figure 7 displays the responses of output, inflation, money-growth and the one-period
nominal interest rate to a unit contractionary monetary innovation. As can be ob-
served a contractionary shock, increases the one-period nominal interest rate, de-
creases output and inflation and gives rise to an initial decrease followed by an increase
in the growth rate of the money supply. These responses last for approximately 12
months with most of the action taking place on impact. The impact period is taken
to be month 1. The model is not capable of producing the delayed response in output
to a monetary shock that is observed in the data. Recall that Em, the measure of
output in the data, remains fairly constant for 4 months before decreasing persistently
and reaching a minimum two years after the shock. Theoretically, output reaches its
minimum value on impact, and returns smoothly from then on to hit its steady state
value after 14 months. In matching the response of inflation, as given by the change
in the PCE deflator, the model is not able to reproduce the observed pattern. In the
data, after a monetary shock, inflation remains fairly constant for the first six months
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to become negative only then. Once again, the model's response does not produce
this observed delay. In the case of R1,t, the theoretical instrument of monetary policy,
the maximum response is observed on impact unlike in the empirical response where
the maximum is reached on the second period after the shock. This response lasts
for approximately one year.
In the case of the growth rate of the money supply, the model generates an oscil-
lating response, being negative on impact and becoming positive on the third month.
Its empirical counterpart also displays an oscillating behavior becoming negligibly
positive after five months.
For the purpose of making the model's impulse responses of interest rates of various
maturities comparable to the empirical ones, I translate percentage deviations from
the steady state into annual percentage points deviation from the steady state rate
expressed in annual percentage points and plot these responses together.
The solid line in Figure 8 corresponds to the theoretical response and the dashed
line to its empirical counterpart. Recall that the model's parameter were calibrated
in such a way so as to match the initial effect on R1,t in basis points to the one
obtained for the Federal F\mds rate from the empirical exercise. Hence, it comes as
no surprise that the model matches the size of the initial impact on the upper left
panel of Figure 8. The model appropriately captures the fact that the magnitude of
the response to a monetary innovations diminishes as we move towards longer term
rates. On impact R1,t increases by 50 basis points in annual terms while the effect
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on Re,o,t is an increase of 3 basis points. Except for the case of the 3-month yield,
the initial impact is consistently underestimated by the model and relatively more as
we move towards higher maturity yields. For example, in the case of the 24-month
note that the size of the empirical response doubles the size of the theoretical one.
As can be observed in Figure 8, the empirical 24-month bond yield increases by 15
basis point whereas the theoretical yield only rises by 7.4 basis points.
The empirical responses display an interesting pattern. Notice that for all nomi-
nal yields under analysis the response seems to vanish, or even becomes negative in
some cases, around 7 months after a shock, only then to rise again reaching a local
maximum around 12 months after the shock and declining afterwards. The model
seems incapable of matching these dynamic patterns. In fact, the model looses fit to
the data as maturity increases. Hence, in 'reality' there appears to be dynamics with
respect to longer term nominal rates that the model fails to capture, at least for U.S.
data. Empirical nominal long-term rates exhibit a much higher degree of variability
than those produced by the model economy. This result supports those presented by
Shiller (1979) and Fuhrer (1996).16 Also note that nominal shorter-term rates die off
somewhat faster than nominal longer term rates.
In order to study the effects of a monetary innovation on the term structure of real
interest rates I decompose the movement in nominal rates into an expected inflation
16Shiller (1979) documents the excess volatility of the long rate relative to the prediction of the
Pure Expectations Hypothesis. Fuhrer (1996) explores the possibility that this failure of the Pure
Expectations Hypothesis could be the result of not taking into account changes in monetary policy
regimes.
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component and a real interest rate one. Recall equation (16c) (ft,t == tEt(Ct+i -
Ct + E~=l 1rt+k) and notice that the relevant expected inflation term for the i th term
nominal interest rate is the expected average of future inflation over the next i periods.
Therefore, I calculate the time t empirical response of the i-month real interest rate
to a monetary shock as the difference between the time t response of the i-month
nominal interest rate and the average annualized inflation response from period t+1 to
period t + i. According to the results in Figures 13 and 14, nominal interest rates and
inflation move in different directions after a monetary contraction17. This observation
has the implication that the response of nominal interest rates represents a liquidity
effect instead of an expected inflation effect. In other words, after a contractionary
shock real interest rates lie above nominal interest rates. This qualitative empirical
fact is captured by the model.
Figure 9 shows the empirical and theoretical responses of real interest rates af-
ter a contractionary shock for bond yields of maturity 3-months through 60-month.
The initial response in both cases diminishes with maturity, although the theoretical
ones decrease faster. Except in the case of the 3-month yield the model consistently
underestimates the responses of real yields. Notice that the empirical 3-month real
yield jumps on impact 23 basis points while its theoretical counterpart does so by
45 basis points. Moving to longer real yields shows that in the 6o-month case the
17 Notice that this does not hold in the first few months for the 3-month real interest rate due to
the presence of the "prize puzzle". Clearly, for longer maturities, since the average expected inflation
over the maturity horizon under consideration includes periods that do not contain positive inflation,
the overall average expected inflation term becomes negative and the presence of a liquidity effect
is revealed.
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empirical yield increases by 12 basis points while the theoretical one increases by 4
basis points. Empirical real interest rates display a higher degree of persistence and
variability and their responses last longer. In fact, notice that when empirical real
rates reach a local maximum (near its impact level), theoretical real rates are almost
hitting zero.
As in the case of nominal interest rates, the model is incapable of generating such
complex dynamics for longer term rates, nor is it able to magnify and propagate the
effect of a monetary policy shock to real interest rates of longer maturities.
1.6 Conclusion
The exercise conducted in this paper has revealed a nmnber of interesting results.
The New Keynesian model is broadly consistent with many features of the data with
respect to the term structure of interest rates. The contemporaneous and first order
autocorrelations with respect to interest rates is fairly well captured by the pure
expectations hypothesis that is embodied in the model. The unfiltered correlations
between R1,t and ~,t decrease somewhat more rapidly in the data as i increases. This
pattern is reversed once the series are filtered. The model has proved to be unable for
reasonable parameter values to capture the sign and magnitude of the correlations
between output and interest rates of various maturities. However, in this respect, the
model is at a clear disadvantage when confronted to the data since only two shocks
were included. It would be desirable to feed the model with a greater variety of
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shocks and to conduct the same exercise at a quarterly frequency in order to use a
more precise measure of output. The observed procyclicality of nominal interest rates
could be generated by a model with other types of shocks, as preference shocks, that
would move output and nominal interest rates in the same direction. The presence
of preference shocks would probably not require such high values of the parameter
that governs the monetary authority's reaction to output deviations (ay). Explaining
the procyclicality of short and long term nominal interest rates clearly deserves and
constitutes a potential avenue for future research.
The empirical exercise has also revealed that the effect of a contractionary mone-
tary policy shock is to induce a liquidity effect by raising the level of real interest rates
above those of nominal interest rates. The model is consistent with this finding. An-
other clear results is that a monetary shock drives up nominal and real interest rates
of all maturities, although the magnitude of the effect decreases with maturity. The
model's prediction is in agreement with this finding as well. This empirical results
constitute supporting evidence to those presented by Evans and Marshall (1998).
However small in magnitude, the dynamic patterns of long-term rates, both nom-
inal and real, are not satisfactorily captured by the model. The results suggest that
empirical nominal and real long-term rates exhibit 'excess volatility' relative to the
expectations hypothesis prediction. In fact, a much higher degree of variability of
longer term rates is present in the data than that produced by the New Keynesian
model.
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A number of unanswered questions deserve further future attention. Would includ-
ing more frictions, either nominal or informational, improve the ability of the model
in matching the behavior of long-term rates? In addition, as stressed by Fuhrer and
Moore (1995b) the behavior of inflation in New Keynesian models is at odds with
U.S data, in which they find a significant degree of persistence. Given the fact that
the dynamics of inflation are crucial for the dynamics of nominal interest rates, it
would be worth exploring the effect that changes in the New Phillips curve would
produce on the term structure of nominal interest rates. Would an hybrid version of
the New Phillips curve in which a backward-looking term is added improve the models
fit ? Finally, what would be the effect of changes in the monetary policy rule on the
term structure? Would a monetary policy rule that reacts to changes in a nominal
longer term interest rate improve the model's fit ? If so, what are the conditions that
determine the equilibrium in such case? And after all, is it desirable?
In conclusion, the model as it stands captures important aspects of the data but
fails to deliver long-term interest rates dynamics that resemble the empirical ones.
The monetary transmission mechanism as it stands in the New Keynesian model is
only a part of the story. Uncovering its true nature remains a theoretical puzzle.
xliv
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Household's problem
Control variables of the problem are: {Ct, K t,M t , {Bi,t}i=l' Lt}. I will condense the
state variables in a 'state vector' St == [Kt - 1, M t- 1, {Bi,t-1}i=1] for notational conve-
nience.
The problem could be stated as follows,
M t Li+17V(St) == max[lnCt + ryln - - ~-1- + f3EtV(St+1)]
Pt + rJ
n
b · '"" B qi-1 t Wt L (Tt ( ~))K Mt- 1su Ject to L...J i,t-1--' + - t + - + 1- U t-1 + --+
i=l Pt Pt Pt Pt
H t Qt ~ qi t M t cPk ( K t ) 2+- + - ~ L...JBi,t-' + - +Ct +Kt + - -- -1 Kt- 1
Pt Pt i=l Pt Pt 2 K t- 1
where V(.) is the value function. First order conditions could be find by differentiating
the following Lagrangian with respect to the control variables and then finding the
envelope conditions.
M L 1+17 nt t () ( '"" qi-1 t£, == InCt + ryln - -1/J-1- + f3EtV St+1 + J-lt L...JBi,t-1--'+
Pt + rJ i=l Pt
Wt Tt M t- 1 H t Qt
-Lt + (- + (1 - 6))Kt - 1 + - + - + -
Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt
n ()2qi t M t cPk K t
-L Bi,t-' - - - Ct - K t - - -- - 1 Kt- 1)
i=l Pt Pt 2 K t- 1
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First order conditions are,
aV(St)
aKt
aV(St)
aCt
aV(St)
aMt
aV(St)
aBi,t
aV(St)
aLt
f3E aV(St+l) _ (1 + ~ (Kt - 1)) == 0t aK J1;t VJk K
t t-I
~ (3E aV(St+l) - - 0
Ct + taCt Pt -
== ~ (3E aV(SHI) - ~ - 0
'Y M + t aM J1;t-t t ~
(3E aV(St+l) _ qi,t == 0 \-I. == 1t aB J.Lt v 2 , •• , ni,t Pt
-~/'L'YJ (3E aV(St+l) Wt - 0
'f' t + t aL + J1;t -
t Pt
Envelope conditions are,
aV(St)
aCt- 1
aV(St)
aKt- 1
aV(St)
IJMt - 1
aV(St)
aBi t-I,
aV(St)
aLt- 1
O aV(St+l) == 0
=} aCt
( rt cPk ( K; ))== J.Lt (- + (1 - 6)) - - 1 - -2- ::::}Pt 2 K t - I
=} aV(SHI) = (( rt+1 + (1 _ 8)) _ cPk (1 _Kl+.I))
aKt Pt+l PHI 2 Kl
J.Lt aV(St+l) J1;t+1
-::::} ==-
Pt aMt Pt+1
qi-I,t aV(St+l) qi-l,t+1
== J1;t-- => == J1;t+ I
Pt 8Bi,t Pt+1
== 0 aV(St+l) == 0
=} aL
t
liii
r ---
I
Plugging the above conditions back into the FOe's yield,
1 (A.I)J-Lt == Ct
1+¢k ( Kt -1) (3E/,t+l ((t+1 + 1_6) _ ¢k (1 _Kl~l) ) (A.2)Kt- 1 J-Lt Pt+1 2 Kt
Pt Pt (A.3)J-Lt -,M
t
== /3Et -J-Lt+1
Pt+1
qi,t (3E ( qi-l,t+1 ) Vi == 1, .. , n (A.4)J-LtP; - t J-Lt+1 Pt+1
Wt 1jJLi (A.5)J-L- ==t Pt
1.8.2 The TerlD Structure of Interest Rates
The yield to maturity in the case of zero-coupon bonds is equal to the interest rate
on that bond. Since the yield to maturity is that nmnber which discounts the future
payment to the price of the bond today, we have that,
1 --1
qi,t == (R. )i == Ri,t
~,t
(A.6)
assuming the principal on the bond is equal to 1. Here ~,t stands for the gross yield
to maturity and it,t == (~,t)i. Notice that for i == 0 the following holds Vt
1
qO,t = (1?{),t)O = 1
Loosely speaking, the above equation says that a bond that promises to pay one dollar
liv
now, costs one dollar now.
First order condition (A.4) then implies for i == 1,
ql,t
I-ttp;
ql,t
il-1l,t
== j3E t (11tH qo,t+1 )Pt+l
j3Et (l-tt+1 J!!.-)
I-tt Pt+l
j3Et (fLt+l J!!.-)
I-tt Pt+l
Take first order condition (A.4) again and rewrite it as,
j3E ( fLt+l Pt )qi,t - t ----qi-l,t+l ===>fLt Pt+l
il-1 == j3Et (fLt+l J!!.-il~l )i,t II. P ~-l,t+l
~t t+l
Using the above expression together with The Law of Iterated Expectations we can
find the general expression. So, for example, in the case where i == 2 the equation
above becomes,
il-1 j3E (fLt+l J!!.-il- 1 )2,t t II. P l,t+l
r't t+l
j3Et (I1t+l J!!.- f3Et+l (l-tt+2 Pt+l))
Itt Pt+1 I-tt+1 Pt+2
/32 Et (l-tt+2 J!!.-)fLt Pt+2
It is easy to see that along the optimal path, the time t price of a bond with maturity
Iv
i is given
Or alternatively,
The time t yield curve for nominal interest rates would then be given by the following
expression,
Or by using (A.I)
( (C) () (C )) -Iii1 t Pt t Pt~ t == - E t -- E t - + COVt ----
'(3 Ct+i Pt+i Ct+i ' Pt+i (A.7)
Equation (I6c) emerges as the first-order Taylor expansion of equation (A.7)
around the steady state. Notice that if we assume that gross steady state inflation is
equal to one and that there is no consumption growth in steady state (Ct == Ct+1 == C)
then,
-- l' 1Ri = (3t =? ~ = 73 Vi = 1, ... , n
which establishes that the term structure of nominal and real interest rates is flat in
lvi
steady state and determined by the value of (3.
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Table 1: Unfiltered standard deviations ofnominal interest rates.
Standard Deviation (units percent) : Unfiltered series
FF Rl R3 R12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical 0.230 0.226 0.216 0.204 0.192 0.181 0.171
Empirical 0.240 0.199 0.194 0.190 0.185 0.183 0.182
Std Dev ofRi / Std Dev of the monetary policy instrument: Unfiltered series
FF Rl R3 R12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical 1000~ 99% 940/0 890/0 840/0 790/0 740/0
Empirical 100% 83% 81% 79% 77% 760/0 760/0
OJ(, Change in the Std Dev : Unfiltered series
FF Rl R3 R12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical -10/0 -4% -6% -6% -60/0 -60/0
Empirical -170/0 -3% -20/0 -30/0 -10/0 -10/0
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Table 2: Unfiltered contemporaneous correlations between nominal interest rates, output
and inflation.
Contemporaneous Correlations (Unfiltered series) : Theoretical values
R1 R3 R12 R24 R36 R48 R60 Output Inflation
Rl 1.00
R3 1.00 1.00
R 12 0.98 0.99 1.00
R24 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00
R36 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
R48 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
R60 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Output -0.98 -0.99 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 1.00
Inflation 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 -0.98 1.00
Contemporaneous Correlations (Unfiltered series) : Empirical values (1963ml to 200Om12)
FF R3 R 12 R24 R36 R48 R60 Output Inflation
FF 1.00
R3 0.97 1.00
R 12 0.95 0.98 1.00
R24 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.00
R36 0.89 0.93 0.97 1.00 1.00
R48 0.87 0.91 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00
R60 0.85 0.90 0.94 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
Output 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 1.00
Inflation 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.59 -0.14 1.00
lix
d' fl ·I' bddtitilbITa e 3: Un I tere Irst or er autocorre atlon etween Interest rates, output, an m atlon.
First order autocorrelations (Unfiltered series): Theoretical values
R 1 (-1) R 3 (-1) R 12 (-1) R 24 (-1) R 36 (-1) R 48 (-1) R 60 (-1) Output (-1) Inflation (-1)
R1 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 -D.97 0.93
R3 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 -0.99 0.95
R 12 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 -1.00 0.98
R24 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.98
R36 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.98
R48 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.99
R60 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.99
Output -0.98 -0.99 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -D.99 1.00 -D.98
Inflation 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 -0.98 0.99
First order autocorrelations (Unfiltered series) : Empirical values (l963ml to 2000m12)
FF(-1) R3 (-1) R12 (-1) R24 (-1) R36 (-1) R48 (-1) R60 (-1) Output (-1) Inflation (-1)
FF 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.09 0.70
R3 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.11 0.68
R12 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.12 0.66
R24 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.17 0.64
R36 0.88 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.19 0.62
R48 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.21 0.60
R60 0.85 0.89 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.22 0.60
Output 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.22 1.00 -0.14
Inflation 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.57 -0.14 1.00
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Table 4: H-P filtered standard deviations ofnominal interest rates.
Standard Deviation (units percent) : H-P filtered series
FF R1 R3 R 12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical 0.056 0.046 0.032 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.025
Empirical 0.106 0.082 0.076 0.069 0.064 0.061 0.057
Std Dev ofRi / Std Dev of the monetary policy instrument: H-P filtered series
FF' Rl R3 R12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical 100% 81°k 57% 52°k 490/0 46% 44%
Empirical 100% 77% 72% 65% 60% 58% 54%
% Change in the Std Dev : H-P filtered series
FF Rl R3 R 12 R24 R36 R48 R60
Theoretical -19% -29% -9% -6% -60/0 -6%
Empirical -230/0 -60/0 -9% -80/0 -4ok -6%
lxi
an output.
Contemporaneous Correlations (H-P filtered series (14400» : Theoretical values
R1 R3 R 12 R24 R36 R48 R60 Output I~flation
R1 1.00
R3 0.98 1.00
R 12 0.74 0.85 1.00
R24 0.58 0.71 0.97 1.00
R36 0.51 0.66 0.95 1.00 1.00
R48 0.48 0.63 0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00
R60 0.46 0.61 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
Output -0.71 -0.82 -1.00 -0.98 -0.97 -0.96 -0.95 1.00
Inflation -0.14 0.04 0.56 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.82 -0.60 1.00
Table 5: H-P filtered contemporaneous correlations ofnominal interest rates, inflation,
d
Contemporaneous Correlations (H-P filtered series (14400» : Empirical values (1963ml to 2000m12)
FF R3 R 12 R24 R36 R48 R60 Output Inflation
FF 1.00
R3 0.86 1.00
R 12 0.78 0.92 1.00
R24 0.70 0.85 0.97 1.00
R36 0.64 0.79 0.94 0.99 1.00
R48 0.60 0.76 0.91 0.97 0.99 1.00
R60 0.57 0.73 0.89 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00
Output 0.67 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.43 1.00
Inflation 0.42 0.34 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.33 1.00
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P filtered).Table 6: Correlations between the yield curve and output (H-
Filtered Lagged Contemparaneous
correlations Taylor-rule Taylor-rule
with Yt ay: 0.8 I ay= 1 ay=O.8 I fry: 1
R1 -0.40 -0.42 0.05 0.06
R3 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.16
R 12 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.21
R24 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.22
R36 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.22
R48 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.22
R60 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.22
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1· bddfia e 1tere lrst or er autocorre atlon etween Interest rates, output an m ation.
First order autocorrelations (H-P filtered series): Theoretical values
R 1 (-/) R 3 (-1) R 12 (-/) R 24 (-/) R 36 (-/) R 48 (-/) R 60 (-/) Output (-/) Inflation (-/)
R/ 0.71 0.70 0.55 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.35 -0.52 -0.07
R3 0.73 0.75 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.49 -0.64 0.07
R 12 0.65 0.74 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.78 -0.85 0.45
R24 0.56 0.67 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.84 -0.86 0.57
R36 0.52 0.63 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 -0.85 0.61
R48 0.50 0.62 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 -0.85 0.63
R60 0.49 0.61 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 -0.85 0.64
Output -0.63 -0.72 -0.85 -0.83 -0.82 -0.81 -0.80 0.85 -0.48
Inflation 0.08 0.22 0.58 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.72 -0.60 0.75
First order autocorrelations (H-P filtered series) : Empirical values (1 963ml to 2000m12)
FF (-1) R3 (-/) R/2 (-1) R24 (-J) R36 (-/) R48 (-1) R60 (-/) Output (-1) Inflation (-1)
FF 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.74 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.40
R3 0.70 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.31
R12 0.64 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.58 0.27
R24 0.58 0.72 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.53 0.26
R36 0.53 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.26
R48 0.51 0.65 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.46 0.26
R60 0.48 0.62 0.73 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.43 0.27
Output 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.97 0.27
Inflation 0.45 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.96
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Figure 1: Unfiltered correlation with the instrument ofmonetary policy.
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Figure 2: First order autocorrelation between inflation and lagged interest rates.
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Figure 3: Correlation with the instrument ofmonetary policy.
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Figure 4: First order autocorrelation with the lagged instrument of monetary policy (H-P
filtered).
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Figure 5: Empirical impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure 6: Empirical impulse responses ofbond yields to a contractionary monetary policy
shock.
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Figure 7: Theoretical impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock of
output, inflation, the growth rate of the money supply, and the one-period nominal
interest rate.
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Figure 8: Nominal interest rates. Empirical and theoretical impulse responses to a
contractionary monetary policy shock in percentage points per annum.
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Figure 9: Real interest rates. Empirical and theoretical impulse responses to a
contractionary monetary policy shock in percentage points per annum.
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Chapter 2
Should Monetary Policy Use
Long-Term Rates?
2.1 Introduction
Long-term interest rates playa central and potentially important role in the conduct
of monetary policy. On the one hand, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
is traditionally perceived as going from a short-term nominal interest rate, assumed in
general to be the instrument of monetary policy, to a long-term real interest rate that
influences aggregate demand. On the other hand, there have been proposals involving
the explicit use of nominal long-term interest rates for the conduct of monetary policy.
The goal of this paper is to study two potential ways in which central banks can use
long-term nominal interest rates to implement monetary policy: a) reacting to long-
lxxiv
term rates, and b) setting long-term rates.
a) Reacting to long-term rates.
Federal Reserve policy-makers have recently come to rely on long-term nominal
interest rates to measure the private sector's long-term inflationary expectations. The
Fisher decomposition reveals that two terms are crucial for the equilibrium determina-
tion of nominal interest rates: an expected real rate and an expected inflation term.
Hence, a monetary authority that desires to keep inflation under control might be
interested in the use of reaction functions for monetary policy that incorporate long-
term yields as arguments, as long as the predominant force moving long-term yields
is the expected inflation term. In fact, Ireland's (1996) statistical results suggest that
this is the main force responsible for most of the movements observed in long-term
yields. Therefore, monetary policy makers are well justified to interpret movements
in long-term rates as reflecting underlying movements in long-term inflationary ex-
pectations. Goodfriend (1993) has convincingly argued that in order to establish and
maintain credibility during the period 1979 to 1992, the Federal Reserve reacted to
the information in long-term nominal interest rates about long-term inflationary ex-
pectations. Additionally, McCallum (1994) has shown that a monetary policy rule
that responds to the prevailing level of the spread between a long-term rate and a
short-term rate can rationalize an important empirical failure of the expectations
hypothesis.1 Additionally, Mehra's (1996) and Mehra's (2001) econometric results
1This failure is related to the magnitude of the slope coefficients in regressions of the short rate
on long-short spreads. A partial interpretation of the expectations hypothesis implies that the slope
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reveal that the federal funds rate reacted to movements in a long-term bond yield in
the 1979-1992 period2 • But if changes in long-term yields help explain movements in
the federal funds rate, then estimation of monetary policy rules without a term that
includes a long-term nominal interest rate will be incorrectly specified. Surprisingly,
the positive and normative aspects of these empirical results and this theoretical pro-
posal of allowing the central bank to react to movements in long-term rates have not
yet been studied in the context of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.
On the positive side, it can be shown that the theory of the term structure that
emerges from optimizing behavior is the expectations hypothesis in a standard New
Keynesian model. Thus, the market determines nominal long-term interest rates as
the average expected level of nominal short-term interest rates over the maturity
horizon under consideration. A monetary policy reaction function that includes a
long-term rate immediately raises the question of whether or not a unique rational
expectations equilibrium exists in this case. The question is important since the
expectations hypothesis provides a channel through which the levels of longer term
rates are determined by the expected future path of the short-term rate, and simul-
taneously, the proposed monetary policy rule provides a channel through which the
level of the relevant long-term rate determines the current short-term rate. What are
coefficient, b, in a regression of the form, 1/2(R1,t - R1,t-l) = a + b(~,t - R1,t-l) + shock, should
have a probability limit of 1. Many empirical findings in the literature yield a value for b considerably
below 1. As shown by McCallum (1994) the expectations hypothesis is consistent with these findings
if it is recognized that the term premium follows an exogenous random process and monetary policy
involves smoothing of the instrument as well as a response to the level of the spread.
2Mehra (2001) measures the long-term bond yield by the nominal yield on 100year U.S. Treasury
bonds.
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the conditions that guarantee a unique rational expectations equilibrium when the
central bank's actions depend on the level of a long-term rate?
On the normative side, assuming that the conditions that ensure a unique rational
expectations equilibrium exist, important questions remain to be answered. Is such
an interaction between short-term and long-term rates desirable according to some
standard loss function criterion? Which is the best maturity length for the monetary
authority to react to?
To study these questions I propose a modification of a standard Taylor rule that
adds a long-term rate as an additional variable to which the central bank adjusts its
short-term rate. In the context of a standard New Keynesian model, I show that
there are vast regions of the parameter space where a unique rational expectations
equilibrium exists when the central bank conducts policy in this manner. However, I
find that reacting to movements in long-term rates does not improve the performance
of the central bank, regardless of the maturity length in question.
b) Setting long-term rates.
Another potential use for long-term nominal interest rates is the possibility of
using them as instruments of monetary policy. The current low levels of inflation
experienced by developed economies in recent years have raised an important number
of new challenges for the conduct of macroeconomic policy. Among these is the
problem of whether long-run rates of inflation and levels of short-term nominal interest
rates can get sufficiently low that monetary policy becomes ineffective in its attempts
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to combat an economic recession. This problem might occur if the instrument of
monetary policy, assumed in general to be a short-term nominal interest rate, hits its
lower bound of zero. Japan's recent economic downturn, in which overnight money-
markets interest rates were virtually zero, together with the recently low levels of the
federal funds rate in the U.S. has motivated an interest in the study of alternative
monetary policy actions. Clouse et. al. (2000) review a number of alternative actions
that the monetary authority might take in this case. Among the candidates is the
possibility that the monetary authority intervenes in longer-term treasury securities
markets. It is a well known stylized fact that the yield curve is usually upward sloping,
suggesting the possibility of further stimulating aggregate demand through longer-
term rates once short-term rates hit their zero bound3• Additionally, intervention in
long-term bond markets might influence expectations about the path of the short-
term rate, and hence the path of future traditionally perceived policy.
Regardless of the zero bound problem, the possibility of using long-term rates as
instruments of monetary policy in a formal monetary model has received surprisingly
little attention in the literature, and this analysis seems interesting in its own right.4
In this paper, I study equilibrium determinacy under policy rules that set a nomi-
3In fact, Hicks (1937, p. 155) states:
"In an extreme case, the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But if so, the
long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that the short rate may
rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be observed that the short rate can only rise, it
cannot fall."
4McGough, Rudebusch and Williams (2004) is a notable exception. Their analysis is independent
and contemporaneous to my own. I am grateful to Glenn Rudebusch for bringing this related work
to my attention.
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nal interest rate other than the short-term rate, and show that, for reasonable parame-
ter values, a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists. The normative results
reveal that under certain preferences of the central bank, long-term rates perform
better than the traditional short-term rate.5
One might initially suspect that a unique rational expectations equilibrium will
not arise if the central bank decides to set, for instance, a two-period nominal interest
rate. The reason is that, if the central bank wishes to set the two-period interest
rate in a context in which the expectation hypothesis holds true, then there will exist
infinite combinations for the one-period interest rate that satisfy the central bank's
setting of the two-period rate. Notice that abstracting from a term premium and
default risk, the two-period rate is an average of today's one-period rate and today's
expectation of the one-period rate tomorrow. Interestingly, as shown below, this
suspicion turns out to be incorrect.
There has been surprisingly little analysis of the theoretical and normative impli-
cations of allowing the central bank to conduct policy by setting a long-term nominal
interest rate in the context of a formal macroeconomic model of the monetary trans-
5It is fair to point out that I have decided to perform the analysis on a "normal" environment as
opposed to a liquidity trap setting. Although a formal study of the possibility of getting around a
liquidity trap by using long-term rates is outside the scope of the present work, the problems studied
here are first necessary steps to be taken for the following reasons. First, if long-term rates cannot
be used under 'normal' circumstances of the economy, then presumably they will not work under
'abnormal' conditions in which additional restrictions on the behavior of the variables are imposed.
Second, studying the possibility of using long-term rates as instruments in a simple model of the
monetary transmission mechanism allows us to focus on the key implications of such use, permitting
us to compare and isolate the effects that implementing this proposal has on the economy.
Also note that in a liquidity trap setting the problem becomes esentially non-linear, making the
standard techniques unsuitable.
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mission mechanism.6
It should be pointed out that the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism
changes under these potential uses for long-term rates. In the context of the New
Keynesian model with a monetary policy reaction function of the Taylor type, interest
rates of maturities larger than or equal to two periods are redundant for the equilib-
rium determination of inflation, output and the one-period interest rate. However, if
the policy rule involves the explicit use of some longer-term rate, then interest rates
of maturities equal or smaller than that used by the monetary authority need to be
incorporated explicitly into the system of equations. Under the conventional view
of the monetary transmission mechanism, the long-term real interest rate matters
through the influence it exerts on aggregate demand. Under these potential uses for
long-term nominal rates, the long-term real rate continues to be the relevant rate for
aggregate demand, but longer-term nominal interest rates now have an effect on the
way shocks are propagated throughout the economy. In other words, the monetary
transmission mechanism in a New Keynesian framework is not independent of the
choice of monetary policy rule.
These alternative monetary policy rules are studied in the context of a simple
New Keynesian model for the following reasons. First, a standard version of the
New Keynesian model embodies the traditional view of the monetary transmission
mechanism, in which the central bank controls the short-term nominal interest rate,
6McGough, Rudebusch and Williams (2004) analyse related problems of the possibility of using
a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument in a similar New Keynesian model.
!xxx
while the long-term real interest rate determines aggregate demand. Second, as em-
phasized by Goodfriend and King (1997), the New Keynesian model has achieved a
certain consensus in the macroeconomic literature, to the point that the authors refer
to it as the New Neoclassical Synthesis. Third, the New Keynesian model is now ex-
tensively used for theoretical analysis of monetary policy.7 For these reasons, the New
Keynesian model is a natural candidate for the study of alternative monetary policy
rules. In the context of this model I address the issue of existence and uniqueness
of the rational expectations equilibrilllIl under the proposed monetary policy rules,
as well as their desirability according to a standard criterion for evaluating monetary
policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a standard
New Keynesian model. Section 3 discusses determinacy of the rational expectation
equilibrium under the proposed monetary policy rules as well as their implications
for the dynamic behavior of the economy. Section 4 studies the problem of optimal
monetary policy and establishes whether or not, under the proposed calibrations,
long-term rates should be used. Section 5 summarizes the main results of the paper
and concludes by suggesting potential avenues for future research.
7See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997), Walsh (1998), Woodford
(2003) and the references therein.
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2.2 The New Keynesian Model
The model presented here is a standard New Keynesian model with an extended set
of equilibrium conditions in order to allow for an explicit consideration of the term
structure of interest rates. Instead of working through the details of the derivation, I
present the key aggregate relationships.8 The aggregate behavioral equations in the
model evolve explicitly from the optimizing behavior of households and firms. As
is usually done in the literature, the equations are presented in log-linear terms, so
that variables are expressed as percentage deviations from their steady state values.
Hence, it is assumed that the economy operates in an equilibrium near a steady state
path.
If we let Xt stand for the output gap, the difference between the current level of
output and the level of output that would prevail if prices were fully flexible, then
the aggregate demand curve makes the current level of the output gap depend on the
expected future level of the output gap and the one-period real interest rate.
In the equation above, R1,t stands for the one-period nominal interest rate, 7ft
stands for the inflation rate during period t, at is a technology shock with persistence
governed by p, and 9t is a preference shock with persistence governed by ¢ and size
8The appendix provides a detailed presentation of the model. Additionally, see Ireland (2003),
Woodford (2003) and Yun (1996) for relatively similar versions of the New Keynesian model.
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J-lg 9 . Notice that we could alternatively write the above expression as an equation for
the equilibrium determination of the short-term rate,
(2.2)
It can be shown that the theory of the term structure of interest rates that emerges
from optimizing behavior in the context of the new Keynesian model is the expecta-
tions hypothesis. Io This implies, for example, that in the log-linear specification the
current two-period nominal interest rate is determined by the average of the current
short-term rate and the current expectation of the following period short-term rate.
Formally we have, R2,t =: ! (R1,t + E tR1,t+l). In general, an i-period nominal interest
rate is determined by the expected future path of the short-term nominal interest rate
over the maturity horizon (i) in question. The nominal interest rate at t associated
with a zero-coupon bond that promises to pay one dollar at the end of period t + i-I
is given by,
1 i
R;"t = i Et L R1,t+k-l ,Vi 2: 2
k=l
(2.3)
Firms are assumed to operate in an environment characterized by monopolistic
competition in the goods market and by price stickiness. Factor markets are assumed
to be competitive and goods are produced with a constant returns to scale technology.
9Notice that for the purpose of calibration, it is equivalent to assign a value for /-£9 and assume
that the standard deviation is 1, or to set I-£g to 1 and then calibrate the standard deviation of the
shock. This choice is only a matter of preference and has no implications for any of the results.
lOSee the appendix for derivation.
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Following Calvo (1983) it is assumed that each period there is a constant probability
that a given firm will be able to adjust its price, independently of past history. Since
there is a continuum of firms on the unit interval, the law of large numbers ensures
that in each period a fraction of firms, governed by the probability of adjustment,
will reset the price. Lucky firms set the new chosen price so as to maximize the ex-
pected discounted value of future profits. It can be shown that the above assumptions
produce the log-linear New Phillips curve given by,
(2.4)
The expectational Phillips curve relates the current inflation rate, 1ft , to expected
future inflation Et1rt+l' the output gap, Xt and a cost-push shock, Vt, with size {tv and
with persistence given by ()ll. The parameter A > 0 governs how inflation reacts to
movements of output from its natural level. A larger value of Aimplies that there is a
greater effect of output on inflation. In this sense, prices may be viewed as adjusting
faster, or subject to a smaller friction. The household's discount factor (3 is restricted
to lie between 0 and 1.
Finally to close the model, we need assumptions about the behavior of the mone-
tary authority. In the case considered as standard, the monetary authority is assumed
11It can be shown by working through the details of the derivation of equation (2.4) that J-tv is
given by,
Strictly speaking the size of the cost-push is governed by {Lv in the non-linear setup and the overall
impact in the linear version of the model is given by the expression above.
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to conduct monetary policy by setting the short-term nominal interest rate, R1,t, in
response to changes in the current level of the output gap, inflation and in the previ-
ous period short-term interest rate. The standard case characterizes monetary policy
as a commitment to the following Taylor-type rule,
(2.5)
where bt is a monetary policy shock whose size is governed by Ilb O
Under the first proposed use for long-term rates, the monetary authority conducts
policy by setting the short-term rate according to (2.5), but it is also allowed to react
to movements in some long-term yield. Formally, in this case the monetary authority
is committed to conduct policy by virtue of,
(2.6)
Throughout the paper, policy rules that allow a reaction to long-term rates will be
called type-1 rules. I study policy rules of type-1 for maturities 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40,
which for a quarterly frequency, corresponds to a term structure composed of bonds
with maturities 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years respectively.
Under the second proposed use for long-term rates, the monetary authority is
assumed to conduct monetary policy by setting some longer-term rate according to a
policy rule of the form,
~,t = T~,t-l + aJrt + l5Xt + J.Lb bt (2.7)
Policy rules for which the instrument of monetary policy is other than the short-
term rate will be labeled type-2 rules. Notice that the equation above is similar to a
standard Taylor-rule except for the interest rate that is being set by the central bank.
As before, the selected term structure for type-2 rules is 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40.
Finally the stochastic block of the model is assumed to behave as given by,
at = pat-l + Ef (2.8)
bt = Ebt
gt = cjJgt-l + Ef
Vt = f)Vt-l + E~
where the parameters are restricted as follows: Ipl < 1, IcjJl < 1,lpl < 1, and the
shocks €f, E~, Ef and Ef are assumed to be i. i. d. with normal distributions, zero mean
and standard deviations given by, a €a, a€b, a€g, and a€v respectively.
In the standard case, the model consists of equations (2.2), (2.4), (2.5) and the
exogenous stochastic block (2.8). Notice that in this case the set of equilibrium
conditions determining the term structure of interest rates, (2.3), plays a redundant
role. That is, once the model is solved, one can use the solution for R1,t to construct
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the implied solution for interest rates of maturities greater than or equal to two.
However, if for example, the monetary authority chooses a type-2 rule for which
i = 20, then interest rates of maturities less than or equal to 20 need to be explicitly
included in the system. In this case the model is given by equations (2.2), (2.4), the
set of (2.3) up to i = 20, the policy rule (2.7) and the block of shocks given by (2.8).
The model is calibrated as follows. The parameters f3 and A are fixed throughout
the study. These parameters are set to 0.99 and 0.14 respectively, as usually done
in the literature. The choice of f3 implies that the steady state nominal and real
interest rates are approximately 4% in annual terms.12 The value for A implies an
expected price-contract length of one yearl3 . The parameters governing the behavior
of the exogenous variables, p, ¢, 8, J-lb' J-lg and J-lv are not relevant for assuring a llllique
equilibrium.14 However the dynamics and volatility of the economy are in fact affected
by the size and persistence of the shocks that hit the system. Following Cooley and
Prescott (1995), p is set equal to 0.95 and the standard deviation of the technology
shock, (7Ea , is set to 0.7 expressed in percentage terms. The shocks associated with the
parameters ¢ and 8 are known in the literature to be higWy persistent innovations.15
12In steady state the real and nominal interest rates are equal since it is assumed that the steady
state gross rate of inflation is 1.
13It can be shown using the full blown model that A = (1 - <p)(1 - j3<p)(1 + 'TJ)/<p. Here <p is the
parameter that governs the degree of price stickness and 'TJ the parameter that governs the elasticity of
labor supply. The value of'TJ is set to 0.6 as suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988)
so as to match microeconometric estimates of labor supply elasticities. An expected price-contract
length of one year implies a value of 0.75 for <po
14Since these parameters do not enter the K matrix, the eigenvalues of K are not functions of
their values. Striclty speaking, it is required that expectations of v t+k (the vector of exogenous
variables) do not grow exponentially or explode too fast. My calibration satisfies this requirement.
See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for details.
15See Ireland (2004).
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For this reason their values will be set to 0.95 and 0.95 respectively. Finally the
parameters that control the size or standard deviation of the remaining shocks are
calibrated as follows: in the standard case with T = 0.5, a = 0.6 and 6 = 0.0009,
the values of J.Lb' J.Ly and J.Lv are chosen so as to match the volatility of the output gap,
the interest rate and inflation in the data16 . The output gap is constructed as the
log difference between the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP and real potential
quarterly GDP taken from the U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Office. Inflation
is measured as the quarterly change of the GDP Implicit Price Deflator and finally
the interest rate is taken to be the 3-month Fama and Bliss zero-coupon bond yield
from the CRSP data.
2.3 Equilibrium Determinacy
For the sake of completeness I will briefly review Blanchard and Khan's (1980) results
with respect to the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of the equilibrium solutions
in the case of models of linear difference equations under rational expectations. Write
the model in the following way,
AEt S t+1 = BSt + CVt
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(2.9)
where,
Zt Zt+l
St == and EtS t+1 ==
Pt EtPt+l
Here z is an (m x 1) vector of predetermined variables at t, p is an (n x 1) vector of
non-predetermined variables at t and v is an (k x 1) vector of exogenous variables. A
and B are matrices of dimension (m + n) x (m + n) and C is an (m + n) x k matrix.
Assuming A is of full rank we may rewrite the system of equations as follows,
where,
The analysis of existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of the equilibrium solutions
is concerned with the eigenvalues of the matrix K. Allow in to stand for the number
of eigenvalues of K that are on or inside the unit circle and let fi be the number of
eigenvalues outside the unit circle. We then have the following three cases. If n == n
then there exists a unique equilibrium solution. If fi > n then an equilibrium solution
does not exist, and if n < n then there is an infinity of equilibrium solutions.17
As the reader might appreciate, the study of uniqueness becomes analytically
intractable as we move towards larger maturities. For example, notice that in the
17See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for a detailed presentation.
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case in which monetary policy is conducted by a rule that involves R40,t in some
way, the study of equilibrium determinacy involves analyzing the roots of a 42th_
order polynomial. For this reason, I resort to a numerical study of the problem.
Nevertheless, as shown below, interesting numerical patterns emerge from this study.
It turns out that unique equilibrium solutions exist for empirically implausible
values of some of the parameters in the policy rule. Although this is an interesting
theoretical curiosity, the numerical search will be constrained to a reasonable region
of the parameter space.
2.3.1 Type-1 Rules: Reacting to long-term rates
In this subsection I study the conditions that support a unique rational expectations
equilibrium for the class of type-l rules given by R1,t = 7 R1,t-l + a7rt + 8Xt + 1'Rt,t.
As mentioned earlier, I study this class of rules for maturities 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40.
Figure 1 shows the regions of uniqueness for different values of 7 and 8 in a - ry space
for the case in which the monetary authority reacts to movements in R2,t. A number
of interesting features of this policy rule are worth highlighting. Consider first the
upper-left panel of Figure 1, in which 7 and 8 are set to zero. Notice that the critical
contour, for which the crucial eigenvalue of the K matrix is one, has a downward and
an upward sloping part. The downward sloping portion of the contour reveals that
there is a substitution, in terms of assuring a unique equilibrium, between the reaction
to current inflation, lX, and the reaction to the two-period nominal interest rate, rye It
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is straightforward to verify that the downward sloping portion of the contour is given
by the equation a +, == 1. So determinacy in this region requires a +, > 1. Note
that the Taylor-principle, that the short-term rate must rise sufficiently in response to
movements in inflation to increase real rates, no longer holds in this case. However,
as , becomes 'too large', the policy rule is unable to produce a unique outcome.
The intuition for this result, which keeps showing up as we move towards higher
maturities, is the following. For simplicity set the disturbances to zero and recall
that the two-period rate could be written, according to the Fisher decomposition, as
follows
The above expression shows that by reacting to the two-period rate, the monetary
authority is implicitly reacting to the average expected path of inflation in the fol-
lowing two periods. This explains why there is a substitution in reacting to R2,t or
1ft. To gain intuition about the upward sloping portion of the contour, recall that,
according to the expectations hypothesis, we may alternatively write R2 ,t as,
The problem is that a 'too large' value of , allows self-fulfilling expectations to take
place. To see why, observe that expectations that interest rates will be high become
self-fulfilling, because the expectations of high short-term rates in the future causes
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long-term rates to rise, leading the monetary authority to raise short-term rates.
Thus, in this case the monetary authority validates the initial expectation that short-
term rates will be high. The upward sloping part of the contour shows that there
is a complementarity between a and ry. In this region, a higher value of ry requires
a stronger connection between the short-term rate and inflation in order to avoid
self-fulfilling expectations from happening.
Figure 1 also reveals that increasing the value of the autoregressive coefficient in
the policy rule, T, or the value of the reaction to the output gap, <5, increases the
region of uniqueness in a-ry space. In fact, as in the standard case, it is the long-
run reaction to inflation that matters for ensuring uniqueness. Further numerical
exploration shows that in the downward sloping part of the contour, a condition of
the form, T + a + , > 1, is necessary for determinacy. In the upward sloping part of
the contour, higher values of T and 6 permit, for a given value of a, a higher value
of ,. Notice that the Fisher decomposition implies without loss of generality that
reacting positively to R2 is equivalent to an implicit negative reaction to the current
output gap. To see this consider (2.6), the type-l policy rule with i equal to 2 and
rewrite it with the help of the Fisher decomposition as,
2
''"' "RI,t = TRI,t-1 + a1rt + 2" L.JEt1rt+k + (8 - 2")Xt + 2"EtXt+2k=l
Hence, higher values of 6 support higher values of , without implying a negative
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reaction to the current output gap.18
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the regions of uniqueness in 0;-1 space when the
monetary authority reacts to movements in R4 , R12 , R20 and R40 respectively. The
main intuition is preserved. All figures reveal a region of substitution and one of
complementarity between 0; and 1. It can be verified by visual inspection that in the
negatively sloped region of the critical contour a condition of the form, 7+0;+1 > 1, is
required for uniqueness. As we move towards policy rules that involve larger maturity
rates, the upward sloping region of the contour increases its slope. So, for a given
value of 0; it is necessary a higher value of 1, the longer the interest rate, to produce
multiple solutions. The fact that the interest rates in the policy rule are further apart
in terms of maturity explains this result. Recall that expectations that interest rates
will be high become self-fulfilling, because the expectation of high short-term rates
in the future causes long-term rates to rise. When monetary policy reacts to very
long-term rates, self-fulfilling expectations require that the response of the short-term
rate to this movement be sufficiently strong so as to feed through the term structure
with enough strength to move this very long-rate in a self-validating manner. So, as
a stylized nlllllerical observation, if the condition T + 0; + 1 > 1 is satisfied, for given
values of the other parameters, the larger the maturity in a type-l rule, the larger
the value of 1 that supports a unique solution of the system.
18It can be shown in the context of the standard case (i.e with a policy rule of the form R1,t =
rR1,t-l + a1rt + <5Xt) that under the proposed calibration of the model, in particular A = 0.14, for
a > 1, there are multiple solutions so long as <5 < O.
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Up to this point I have shown that there are vast and empirically plausible regions
of the parameter space for which type-l rules yield a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. Why should uniqueness be a desirable property of any policy rule?
Rules that support multiple solutions are problematic. The mere fact that such a
rule may be consistent with a potentially desirable equilibrium is of little importance
if it is also equally consistent with other, much less desirable equilibria. A rule that
implies indeterminacy is consistent with a large set of equilibria, including ones in
which the fluctuations in endogenous variables are arbitrarily large relative to the
size of fluctuations in the exogenous shocks.19 In general, the variables for which
there may be arbitrarily large fluctuations due to self-fulfilling expectations include
the variables that enter the loss function of the monetary authority. Hence at least
some of the equilibria consistent with the rule are less desirable, in terms of the loss
function, than the unique equilibrium associated with any rule that guarantees a
unique solution. For these reasons, the normative analysis restricts its attention to
rules that imply a unique equilibrium. The question of whether or not type-l rules
that yield a unique solution are at all desirable is taken up in section 4.
2.3.2 Type-2 Rules: Long-terlIl rates as instruments
Here I study the conditions under which a unique rational expectations equilibrium
exists for the class of rules given by ~,t = TRi,t-l + Q1rt + 6xt. Recall that in this
19See Bernanke and Woodford (1997) for a formal description of a "sunspot" equilibrium. See
also Woodford (2003, chapter 4).
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case, a longer term interest rate is treated as the instrument set by the monetary
authority. As mentioned, I study this class of rules for maturities 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40.
Figure 6 shows the regions in a - <5 space in which a unique rational expectations
equilibrium exists for three values of the autoregressive coefficient (T). The contour
for which the critical eigenvalue of the K matrix is one is plotted together with some
other contour for which the critical eigenvalue is less than one. This is done to indicate
the direction of increasing/decreasing value of the function in the selected space. As
can be observed, significantly vast regions of the parameter space exist that produce
a unique rational expectations equilibrium.2o Notice that for the selected values for T,
the regions of determinacy in the positive quadrants remain unchanged whatever the
term of the interest rate chosen as instrument. Interestingly, Figure 6 also shows that,
in the positive quadrants, the Taylor-principle holds for the selected values of T. Notice
that a + T > 1 is required for determinacy in these cases. Although the numerical
exercise so far suggests that the Taylor-principle generalizes to maturities other than
one, this is true only in some regions of the policy-parameter space. Figure 7 shows
the areas of uniqueness in a - T space for three values of the reaction to output (<5).
The figure reveals that the Taylor-principle eventually breaks down for longer term
instruments, by displaying an upward sloping section of the critical contour. This
complementarity between a and T shows up for sufficiently positive values of <5. 21
20McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams (2004) too found regions of uniqueness for a policy rule
with a long-term rate instrument in a relatively similar environment.
21 Notice that in Figure 7 the upward sloping section of the contour does not appear in the graph
in the case of R2 as instrument. This is only because of the selected limits of the axes. Sufficiently
negative values of a would reveal this property of the critical contour in the case of R2 and R4
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Interestingly, in the standard case in which the policy instrument is the short-term
rate, the critical contour's slope is always negative one with its equation given by
r == 1- a.
The general result that a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists when the
monetary authority sets an interest rate of maturity other than one is surprising in
light of the intuition previously mentioned. Consider for example the case in which
the central bank decides to set the two-period interest rate. One might initially
believe that a unique equilibrium would not arise in this case since the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure suggests that infinite combinations of the short-
term rate would satisfy the bank's setting of R2 • In fact recall that the expectations
hypothesis says that the two-period rate is determined by R2,t == ~ (R1,t + EtR1,t+l) .
At first sight, one chosen value for R2 ,t could be achieved by infinitely many paths
for R 1, so that uniqueness could not be achieved. Clearly the results show that this
is not the case. To gain intuition why a unique outcome can obtain even when the
bank decides to set a longer term rate consider the following. Loosely speaking, the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure says that long-term rates are determined
by the expected future path of the short-term rate during the maturity horizon in
question. Thus, we generally think that short-term rates determine the level of long-
term rates. However, it is important to realize that the expectations hypothesis works
in the opposite direction as well. In fact, it does not place a restriction as to a direction
of determination for interest rates. To see this formally consider the equation for R2
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and rewrite as a first order stochastic difference equation in R1 ,
Advance the equation one period and substitute it back to obtain,
Repeating this operation many times and using the fact that limj~ooEtR1,t+j == 0
yields,
00
R1,t = 2 ~::)-1)jE tR2,t+j
j=O
(2.10)
Equation (2.10) uncovers why the previous intuition is incorrect. A uniquely expected
path for the two-period rate, as given by (2.10), determines in a unique manner the
current level of the one-period rate. It can be shown that the general expression of the
relevant path to be followed for an interest rate of maturity i in order to determine
the current level of the one-period nominal rate is given by,
R1,t == i (f: Ed4,Hij - f Et~'Hij+l)
j=O j=O
(2.11)
Equation (2.11) generalizes the argument for interest rates of any term. Thus, what-
ever the maturity of the interest rate chosen as instrument, if the monetary policy
rule implies a unique outcome, then the uniquely expected path of the instrument
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uniquely determines the current level of interest rates of longer as well as shorter
maturities.
The result that uniqueness arises even when the central bank decides to use an
interest rate other than the short-term rate for a policy rule of the Taylor-type is
important for several reasons. On a somewhat subtle level, it provides support for
the theoretical study of macro-monetary models at various frequencies without im-
plying any kind of hidden inconsistency. Without taking a stand on whether time is
continuos or discrete, it should almost go without saying that real world economics
occurs at (at least) a daily frequency. Discrete models in monetary economics are
generally studied at a quarterly frequency without an explicit concern on whether or
not the theoretical short-term rate (a 3-month rate), would imply a unique level of the
current overnight rate. Although models are usually studied at a quarterly frequency,
sometimes calibration is done at a monthly or annual frequency. The result presented
here gives a theoretical justification for such choices.
This result is also of practical importance in light of the zero-bound problem.
This problem could arise in an environment of low inflation, in which the monetary
authority faces the risk that the real interest rate could remain high and that it was
not providing sufficient monetary stimulus even though it had pushed the short-term
nominal rate to its lower bound of zero. Japan's recent economic downturn suggests
that this is not a zero probability event. This has motivated different proposals about
what the monetary authority could do in such circumstances. The fact that a unique
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equilibrium exists for longer term rate as instruments of policy, suggests an interesting
potential solution. Since the level of long-term rates is generally above the level of
short-term rates monetary policy may be able to further stimulate aggregate demand
through longer term rates once short-term rates hit their zero bound.22 However,
this is only potentially so, since the present analysis does not constitute a formal
study of using longer-term rates in a liquidity trap setting. Recall that the results are
valid in a neighborhood of the steady state, in which the nominal steady state rate
of interest is about 4% per annum and do not necessarily imply that they will hold
once we depart from this steady state and additional constraints on the path of the
short-term nominal rate are imposed23 •
Without any reference to the zero-bound problem, the result opens up a new
dimension of analysis for monetary policy rules that is interesting in its own right.
Namely, which interest rate, among a given class of rules, performs best? Which
interest rate instrument gets closer to the robustly optimal monetary policy rule
in the sense of Giannoni and Woodford (2002)? The next section addresses these
questions.
22In fact, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan said (in a context in which the federal funds rate was
at a 41-year low of 1.25%) that in addition to pushing the funds rate, the interest rate that banks
charge each other on overnight loans, closer to zero, the Fed can simply begin buying longer-term
Treasury securities to drive longer-term interest rates lower. -Associated Press Newswires, May 21,
2003.
23Studying the possibility of solving the liquidity trap through the use of a long-term interest rate
as the instrument of policy is an exciting problem for future research.
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2.3.3 Dynamics
I have previously shown that large regions of uniqueness exist for type-l and type-
2 rules. Given this fact, what are the dynamic implications associated with these
rules? In other words, it seems interesting to study the way in which the economy
responds to shocks llllder representative type-l and type-2 rules versus a standard
Taylor rule. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate this comparison by displaying the impulse
responses of inflation and output to a monetary-shock and a cost-push for a standard
Taylor rule, and for type-l and type-2 rules using R12 and R40 respectively. Notice
that the parameters remain fixed across rules in order to capture the effects implied
by the maturity dimension of the problem. A number of interesting features arise
from this comparison. In the first place, notice that the signs of the responses do
not change across policies. The qualitative responses of inflation and the output
gap are the same as those generated by a standard Taylor rule. A contractionary
monetary policy shock reduces on impact both inflation and the output gap for all
rules considered, while an adverse cost-push shock increases inflation and decreases
output on impact for all rules as well. These results suggest that type-l and type-
2 rules do not imply 'strange' responses to the disturbances that hit the economy.
Secondly, observe that the size of the responses is significantly affected by the type
of policy rule. In fact, notice that in the case of type-l rules (Figure 8) in response
to a cost-push shock, inflation deviates less than in the standard case while output
suffers a bigger contraction. A similar result shows up in the case of type-2 rules in
c
response to an adverse cost-push shock. In this case, note that the maturity length
of the instrument matters for the determination of the trade-off between output and
inflation deviations from the steady state. Finally, the top panel of Figure 9 shows
that a contractionary monetary shock implies a bigger contraction for inflation and
output the longer the maturity of the instrument interest rate. This arises because the
size of the monetary shock in fact changes across policy rules. That is, a one-standard
deviation of bt attached to a type-2 rule for R40 raises the one-period nominal interest
rate by more than a one-standard deviation of bt in a standard Taylor rule.24 For this
reason the size of the monetary policy shock, J-lb' is set to zero in all policy rules for
the normative analysis.25
As shown, the impulse responses suggest that the dynamic behavior of the econ-
omy is significantly affected by the choice of policy rule. In fact, different rules imply
a distinct trade-off between inflation and output deviations in response to a cost-push
shock. This shock plays a key role in the conduct of monetary policy. It presents the
monetary authority with a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. The
24To see this clearly, take a standard Taylor rule and a type-2 rule for R2. Notice that we may
rewrite the type-2 rule using the expectations hypothesis of the term structure in the following way.
R2 ,t
Rl,t + EtRl,t+l
R1,t
TR2,t-l + a1rt + 8xt + bt
T(R1,t-l + Et-1Rl,t) + 2a1rt + 28xt + 2bt
T(R1,t-l + Et-1R1,t) - EtR1,t+l + 2a1rt + 28xt + 2bt
The last line shows clearly that the disturbances in a standard Taylor rule and a type-2 rule are
actually of a different nature. What Figure 9 suggests is that the size of the disturbance as measured
by the responses of inflation and output are larger, the larger the maturity of the instrument used
by the monetary authority.
25This guarantees that the comparison between policy rules is 'fair' in the sense of capturing only
the impact of the deterministic component.of the rules.
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fact that quantitatively different responses are observed under different rules moti-
Yates the question of what monetary policy rule does best for the central bank. The
next section addresses this question.
2.4 Optimal Monetary Policy
I start by constructing a robustly optimal policy rule following Giannoni and Wood-
ford (2002). I consider a rule that would bring about the optimal equilibrium pattern
of responses to shocks as well as yield a llllique stationary equilibrium for the econ-
omy, so that commitment to the rule can guarantee the desired outcome and not
some other. As generally done in the literature, I assume that the objective of the
monetary authority is to minimize the expected value of a loss criterium given by,
(2.12)
where the bank's discount rate (3 is the same as in (2.4) and the period loss function
is of the form,
L 2 2 R2t == 7ft + wXXt + wR 1,t (2.13)
Here the parameters wx and wR (assumed to be positive) govern the relative concern
for output and short-term nominal interest rate variability. Hence, the monetary
authority faces the problem of minimizing (2.12) subject to equations (2.2) and (2.4).
Notice that minimization is achieved by choosing a time path for {7ft, Xt, Rl,t}~O that
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minimizes the monetary authority's objective and simultaneously satisfies the model's
structural equations at each point in time. The first order conditions of the problem
are given by,
1ft - (3-1Al t-l + A2 t - A2 t-l 0, , ,
1ft - AXt - (3Et1ft+l - J.LvVt 0
where A1,t and A2,t stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS and New
Phillips curve equations respectively. One can use the equations above to substitute
out the Lagrange multipliers in order to obtain a monetary policy rule consistent with
the optimal allocation of the form,
A 1 A W X
R 1 t == (1 + -(3)R1 t-l + -f3~Rl t-l + - 1ft + -DaXt
, , , WR WR
(2.14)
As shown by Giannoni and Woodford (2002), commitment to this rule implies a
unique equilibrium as well as an optimal equilibrium pattern of responses to the
economy's disturbances. Notice that in this case, the optimization is not perfonned
over some parametric family of policy rules (e.g. a Taylor-type rule). The approach
in this case consists of characterizing the best possible pattern of responses to shocks
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by taking the structural equations as constraints, and then finding the policy rille
that generates such an equilibrium.
Most of the recent literature assumes some low-dimensional parametric family of
policy rilles, and then optimizes over the coefficients of the rille, using an economic
model to compute the equilibrium associated with each possible set of parameters.
Since taking into account only a set of monetary policy reaction functions rules out
other possible kinds of feedback, any rule constrained to belong to a given set of rules
cannot perform better than the rule that responds to shocks in the best possible way.
Hence, type-lor type-2 rules could not possibly yield a better outcome than (2.14).
However, studying the degree to which these rules are optimal remains important
for the following reasons. Taking into account the McCallum critique, namely, that
the main problem that policymakers face is uncertainty about the exact structure
of the economy, one realizes that this uncertainty woilld translate into uncertainty
about the exact specification of the optimal monetary policy rule. For this reason
it remains important to understand how a given rule works across different plausible
envirornnents. The exercise done here constitutes a step in this direction for type-l
and type-2 rules. Simple policy rules have also been proposed on the basis of being
operational and simple to communicate to the public. Operationality limits study
of rules that are expressed in terms of instrument variables that could in fact be
controlled by actual central banks and that require only information that could be
civ
possessed by these central banks.26 Although implementation of type-2 rules might
require in some cases modifications in the legislation that applies to central banks,
there is no a priori reason why central banks would not be able to manage policy by
setting a longer term rate. In principle, a central bank with sufficient access to money
balances (and large enough holdings of the asset in question) could stand ready to sell
or buy a long-term bond at a desired target price. Different is the case for example
of assuming that the monetary authority controls a monetary aggregate as M2 whose
determination is not independent of the behavior of the private sector.
I therefore consider the optimal rule, (2.14), as a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of type-1 and type-2 rules. I also take the standard case (a monetary
policy given by (2.5)) as a second benchmark of evaluation. I want to know which
rule among the set of parametric policy rules given by (2.6) and (2.7) gets closer to
the optimal rule. Do type-1 and/or type-2 rules imply gains relative to the standard
Taylor rule? I will restrict attention to type-1 and type 2 rules that result in a unique
stationary rational expectations equilibrium27 •
Table 1 shows, for different calibrations of W x and a value of 0.1 for W R, the value of
the loss function and each of its components for the optimal rule, (2.14), the standard
261f the central bank collects data with a lag, then depending on the frequency of the model,
type-2 rules might not be operational in practice. Notably McGough, Rudebusch and Williams
(2004) address this problem and find regions of uniqueness for policies that set a longer term rate
in response to lagged inflation.
27The loss function used in the calculations is discrete. When a policy-parameter configuration
does not result in a unique equilibrium the central bank is penalized through an arbitrary large
increase of the loss function.
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rule, (2.5), and type-1 rules of the selected term structure.28 This numerical exercise
reveals that reacting to movements in nominal longer-term rates does not present
significant gains. As expected type-1 rules are no worse than the standard rule. In
fact note that the standard rule is a particular case of a type-l rule for which 'Y is
set to zero. Inspection of Table 1 shows not only that type-1 rules achieve a value
of the loss function which is identical to that of the standard rule, but also that the
variances of the relevant variables remain unchanged.29 Further numerical exploration
shows that in the case of type-1 rules there are multiple parameter configurations that
minimize the loss function. In general, for all calibrations and maturities considered
the optimal value of 'Y turns out to be negative. This is a surprising result in light
of Goodfriend (1993)'s account of monetary policy and Mehra (1996)'s econometric
results. Recall that the rationale for allowing the monetary authority to react to
movements in long-term bond yields is that long-term nominal interest rates could
measure the private sector's long-term inflationary expectations. The central bank
might therefore be interested in using reaction functions that incorporate longer-term
rates, so that if they rise the bank raises the short-term rate in its attempts to keep
inflation under control. In other words, this behavior would imply a positive value
of 'Y. Interestingly, there is a very recent macro-finance literature that includes the
28N to th tIE ,",00 (3t( 2 2 R2 ) - 1 (2 2 2 ) S h ° 0 ••o Ice a '2 0 L..d=O 1ft +WxXt +WR 1,t - 2(1-,8) O"7r +WxO"x +WRO"R1 · 0 t at mInImIzIng
J is equivalent to minimizing a weighted average of the variances as given by 2(1=-,8) (a; + wxo"; +
wRO"h1). Since 2(1=-,8) is only a scaling constant, one can focus on the value of j = a; +wxo";+wRO"h1
instead. This is the value of the loss function reported in all tables.
29This is in general true up to the 9th decimal digit. A higher numerical precision shows that
type-l rules are better than the standard rule as one would expect. However, this difference seems
insignificant.
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long-run expected inflation component of the long-term rate in the policy rule and
can justify negative values for ,30.
I find that there is a certain degree of substitution for optimality between the
autoregressive coefficient, 7, and the reaction to long-term rates, ,. Positively higher
values of 7 are associated with negatively smaller values of ,. Loosely speaking, long-
term rates playa redundant role in the RHS of the policy rule. Recall that long-term
rates could be expressed as the expected future path of R1 over the maturity horizon
in question. Therefore, reacting to movements in a longer-term rate is equivalent to
reacting to the expected future path of the instrument in this case. To gain intuition,
consider the case of a type-l rule for i = 2 and rewrite it with the aid of (2.3) as
27 2a 26 ,
R1,t = -2--R1,t-l + -2--1rt + -2--Xt + -2--EtR1,t+l
-, -, -, -,
Note that negative values of , imply (for 7 > 0) a positive "backward-smoothing"
coefficient and a negative "forward-smoothing" coefficient respectively. In addition,
observe that the larger, is in absolute value the larger 7 needs to be to yield a given
value of the backward smoothing term. The fact that the autoregressive coefficient on
R1, 2~T' is the one that matters for the determination of expectations (in particular
EtR1,t+l) explains why there are multiple pairs of 7 and , that minimize the loss
30For example, in response to a perceived decrease in the inflation target (a decrease in the
expected inflation component of the long rate), the monetary authority must increase rates in order
to push inflation down to this lower target. This behavior would justify a negative value of T. See
Rudebusch and Wu (2004)
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function. The expression above also reveals that in the context of type-1 rules a
sufficiently positive value of I would result in a negative reaction to the previous
period short-term rate as well as to the current inflation rate and the current output
gap.
Since there are no significant gains in reacting to movements in longer-term rates,
I do not investigate any further the behavior of type-1 rules under alternative cali-
brations for W x and WR.
Notice that a type-1 rule is a modification of the familiar Taylor rule that adds
a longer-term interest rate as another variable to which the central bank adjusts its
short-term rate instrument. Elsewhere in the literature, others have proposed in-
cluding other asset prices in the Taylor rule, such as stock prices and housing prices.
As Filardo (2000) points out, Goodhart, a former member of the Bank of England's
Monetary Policy Corrunittee, argues that central banks should consider using housing
prices and stock market prices to guide their policy decisions. Goodhart's recommen-
dation is based on the argument that broader measures of inflation that include
housing and stock market prices have the potential of improving macroeconomic per-
formance if asset prices reliably predict future consumer price inflation. Goodhart's
recommendation follows Alchein and Klein's (1973) view that traditional price in-
dices are deficient because they consider only the price of goods consumed today. To
the extent that long-term nominal interest rates capture future signs of inflation, my
simulation results clearly suggest that such a reaction to long yields neither worsens
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nor improves macroeconomic performance as measured by the loss function relative
to the standard Taylor rule (for which ry is set to zero). One could conclude from this
exercise that long-term nominal interest rates do not provide additional information
for the monetary authority than what is already present in the lagged short-term
interest rate, output and inflation. Filardo (2000) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) do
not find a strong case for including asset prices in monetary policy rules as well.
Table 2 shows, for different calibrations of W x and a value of 0.1 for WR, the
value of the Loss function and the value of each of its components for the optimal
rule, (2.14), the standard rule, (2.5), and type-2 rules for the selected interest rates.
Interestingly, medium and long-term rates perform better as instruments in the class
of Taylor-type rules than short-term rates when the concern for output volatility is
relatively low. For example note that when W x equals 0.05, all instruments except R40
do better than R1 • In this case, the best instrument turns out to be the 3-year rate.
Also note that a Taylor-rule with R12 as the instrument, generates a lower variance
for R1 and higher variances for inflation and output relative to the optimal rule, but
lower variances of inflation and output relative to the standard Taylor-rule. When
the concern for output volatility increases to 0.1, the optimal instrument for the class
of Taylor-type rules, turns out to be the 5-year rate. Inspection of Table 2 reveals
that in this case the relevant gain comes from the ability of R20 to generate a lower
variance of inflation. Observe that when W x equals 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 (i.e when the
concern for output deviations is relatively low) the volatility of the short-term rate
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increases as the maturity of the instrument increases. For these parameter values,
using longer-term rates as instruments yields a higher variance of the short-term rate
than that of the standard case. Notice however that this property is not preserved as
the concern for output deviations increases to 0.33 or to 1. Table 3 reproduces the
results of Table 2 but this time with WR set to 1. Notice that as the concern for short-
term variability increases (that is, as we move from Table 2 to Table 3) the variance of
R1 diminishes as expected in all cases and for all the instruments. In Table 3, for all
values of W x considered, the volatility of the short-term rate achieved by rules using
longer-term rates is lower than in the optimal rule case and in the standard case.31
By comparing Tables 2 and 3 it can be observed that, for the class of rules considered,
when the concern for output volatility is relatively low the optimal maturity length of
the instrument is sensitive to the value of W R. For example note, that when W x equals
0.1 and WR equals 0.1, the best instrument turns out to be R20 . However, when W x
equals 0.1 and WR equals 1, the best instrument turns out to be R12 . Despite these
differences in the maturity length, Tables 2 and 3 show an interesting pattern. When
the relative concern for output volatility is low, medium/long-term rates perform
better than the standard instrument and when the concern for output volatility is
31 This is in principle an interesting result in light of the liquidity trap problem. If one would find
that in all the cases in which longer-term rates are used as instruments, the variance of the short-
term rate increases, then the potential solution of using longer-term rates when we approach the zero
bound looses much of its appeal. Additionally as explained by Woodford (2003, chapter 6) it might
be desirable in practice to pursue a policy that involves less volatility of the short-term nominal
interest rate in the presence of large random disturbances than a policy that achieves complete price
stability. The reason being that if disturbances are large in amplitude such a policy might not be
possible because it might requiere the nominal interest rate to be negative at some times.
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high the short-term rate turns out to be a better instrument. One of the main results
of this section is that the optimal maturity length of the instrument depends upon
the parameters determining the preferences of the monetary authority for the class
of Taylor-type rules.
Both tables reveal the presence of two different kinds of trade-off between the
volatility of inflation and the volatility of output. The first is the well known trade-
off that arises when the parameter that governs the relative degree of concern for the
output gap variance, W x , varies. This trade-off is known in the literature as the Taylor
curve. Notice that for all rules considered, as W x varies from 0.01 to 3, the central
bank manages to generate a lower variance for output at the expense of a higher one
for inflation.
The second trade-off between the variance of output and the variance of inflation,
which is new in the literature, shows up in terms of maturities. Notice that a trade-off
between the output and inflation variance appears for given values of W x and W R as we
move along the maturity dimension of the instruments, for the class of standard/type-
2 rules. Notice however that this is not a linear trade-off in all cases. For example,
it is not always the case that when the maturity length of the instrument increases,
one observes a lower variance of inflation at the expense of a higher one for output.
However, it is generally the case, that each 'maturity movement' presents a trade-off
between the two variances.32 Figure 10 illustrates this by plotting the loss function
32 A note of caution is in place. Recall that I have selected a term structure composed of maturities
1,2,4,12,20 and 40. Therefore, a 'maturity movement' means in this case a move from say 4 to 12.
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and its components against the maturity of the interest rate instrument. Panel A
plots the case when W x equals 0.1 and WR equals 0.1. Note that as the maturity of the
instrument increases up to 20, the variance of inflation decreases and the variance of
output increases, but as we move further into the term structure the trade-off changes
its direction. Panel B shows the case when the preferences of the central bank are
given by W x set to 3 and W R set to 0.1. Observe that this time the variance of inflation
decreases and that of output increases but only up to a maturity of 4. The direction
of the trade-off changes above 4. It is important to emphasize that this is a trade-off
that emerges for given values of the parameters that govern the preferences of the
monetary authority, W x and WR. Also note that the precise nature of this trade-off
changes when the preferences of the central bank change.
As an alternative way to understand the behavior of type-2 rules I consider what
happens to the loss function and its components as we deviate from the optimal value
of one of the parameters in the policy rule. Figure 11 illustrates the case in which
the reaction to current inflation, a, changes for the standard rule and type-2 rules
with instruments given by R12 and R40 , while the other parameters, T and 8, remain
fixed at their optimal values. The situation is illustrated in the case of W x set to
0.05 and WR set to 0.1. A variance of zero for any of the components of the loss
function signals that there is not a unique equilibrium for those parameter values.33
The calculations for intermediate maturities have not been done because of the usual limitations.
However the general result that as we move along the term structure eventually a trade-off appears
is preserved for the selected calibrations.
33Since it is never the case that the variances of all the variables in the loss function are simul-
taneously zero in a unique equilibrium, this is a normalization done only for visual convience. The
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Notice that a trade-off between the variance of output and the variance of inflation
emerges as a varies. Increasing a results, for all rules, in a lower variance of inflation
at the expense of a higher variance for output, as one would expect. However, the
precise quantitative nature of the trade-off changes for different instruments. As a
increases from zero the variance of inflation achieved by rules with longer-term rates
is smaller. Except for the case of R40 being the instrument, the variance of the short-
term rate increases as well with increases in a. In the cases of R1 and R12 , there
is trade-off between the volatilities of inflation and the short-term rate. Again, the
precise quantitative extent of the trade-off changes with the instrument. Figure 12
illustrates what happens when the current reaction to the output gap, 8, deviates from
its optimal value, in the case in which W x is set to 3 and WR is set to 0.1. Notice that
all instruments present a trade-off between the volatilities of inflation and output.
However this time, as 8 increases, the policy rules generate a lower variance of output
at the expense of a higher variance for inflation. Note that the volatility of the short-
term rate now displays a trade-off with the volatility of output and not with that of
inflation. Another interesting feature to note is that it seems relatively less costly to
deviate from the optimal value of 8 using R12 as the instrument, instead of R1 or R40 •
This shows up by inspecting the behavior of the loss function as 8 changes.
The main message from this section is that it is not only possible to use longer-
term nominal interest rates as instruments of policy within the class of Taylor-type
reader should therefore not think that the loss function is ever minimized at zero.
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rules, but it is also desirable under certain circumstances. In fact, there are plausible
preferences for the monetary authority that make medium/long-term rates better
instruments, by achieving a value for the loss function that gets closer to that of the
optimal rule. I have also shown that a trade-off between the variances of output and
inflation emerges in the maturity dimension. Hence, for given values of the parameters
that determine the preferences of the central bank and among the class of Taylor-type
rules, this new trade-off faces the monetary authority with a new dimension of choice,
namely, the maturity length of the instrument.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the implications of using long-term nominal interest
rates in the conduct of monetary policy. Under the first use for long-term rates the
monetary authority is allowed to react to movements in some long-term yield. I
have shown that there are plausible regions of the policy parameter space for which
a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium arises under such policy rules,
labeled type-l rules. The normative analysis has revealed that there are no significant
gains from using type-l rules in terms of reducing the value of the loss function.
Surprisingly, the optimal parameter value of the reaction to long-term rates turns
out to be negative in most cases, contradicting the initial intuition that recommends
such use. Recall that the rationale for allowing the monetary authority to react to
movements in long-term bond yields is that long-term nominal interest rates could
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measure the private sector's long-term inflationary expectations. The central bank
might be interested in the use of reaction functions that incorporate longer yields, so
that if they rise the central bank increases the short-term rate in its attempts to keep
inflation under control.
Under the second use for long-term nominal interest rates the monetary authority
is allowed to conduct policy by virtue of a Taylor-type policy rule that sets a longer-
term rate. The exercise conducted in this paper has revealed a number of surprising
aspects of this proposal. Interestingly, significant regions of the policy parameter
space exist where a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium obtains. The
numerical patterns show that the Taylor-principle, namely, that the long run reaction
of the instrument to movements in inflation should exceed one, generalizes to instru-
ments of various maturities in some regions of the parameter space. The general result
that uniqueness arises for instruments other than the short-term rate is important in
many dimensions. As emphasized previously, this result is of practical importance
in light of the zero-bound problem. The existence of a unique equilibrium for longer
term rates constitutes an interesting potential solution to the problem. Because the
level of long-term nominal rates is generally above the level of short-term nominal
rates, the central bank may be able to further stimulate aggregate demand through
longer term rates once short-term rates hit their zero-bound. Regardless of the liq-
uidity trap, longer-term rates may be better instruments in their own right. The
result also opens up a new dimension of analysis for monetary policy rules. All the
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elements of the term structure emerge as potential candidate instruments for the con-
duct of monetary policy. This result also provides theoretical support for the study
of macro-monetary models at various frequencies without implying a deeper inconsis-
tency. Discrete models in macroeconomics are usually set at a quarterly or monthly
frequency without an explicit concern on whether or not the theoretical short-term
rate (a 3-month/l-month rate), would imply a unique level of the current overnight
rate, which is what is typically assumed to be under the control of the central bank.
This result provides a theoretical foundation for such modeling choices.
I then studied the performance of rules involving the explicit setting of a long-term
rate and found that, for the class of Taylor-type rules, they are better instruments
under certain central bank preferences. In particular, the exercise shows that when
the relative concern for output variability is low, medium or long-term rates turn out
to yield a better outcome. I have also found an interesting numerical pattern between
the maturity of the instrument rate and the variances of output and inflation. Namely,
for given preferences of the monetary authority, a trade-off between the variabilities of
output and inflation emerges as we move through the term structure in our choice of
instrument. This highlights one of the main results of the paper. That is, the choice
of maturity length for the instrument is sensitive to the preferences of the central
bank.
The results have opened up many interesting avenues for future research. As
mentioned above, this is not a formal study of the possibility of solving the liquidity
cxvi
I·~~----~--~-
trap by using long-term rates as instruments. However, the results of the paper
constitute a first step in this direction. A formal study of this possible solution
involves a number of complications. For instance, the standard techniques would not
be available in this setting because the problem becomes essentially non linear. Also,
additional constraints on the behavior of the short-term rate would translate into
additional constraints on the behavior of longer-term rates.
Recall, also, that the results are valid in the context of a simple New Keynesian
model. It would therefore be interesting to study the robustness of these results in
different economic environments. For example, are the main results preserved when
investment and capital accumulation are included in the model? Are the results
sensitive to different timing assumptions and different specifications of the Phillips
curve? What happens in an open economy? What happens in alternative models of
the monetary transmission mechanism (e.g. limited participation models)?
The use of long-term nominal interest rates in the conduct of monetary policy has
formally been modeled by changing the specification of a standard Taylor-type rule.
Other kinds of possible feedback rules have therefore been ruled out. For example, it
would be interesting to study more general rules of the form,
(2.15)
in which i, j and k are not constrained in any given way. Note for instance that in the
case of type-l and type-2 rules i is constrained to equal j, and in the case of type-l
cxvii
rules k is constrained to be larger than i. This raises the interesting question of what
the optimal maturity length to which the smoothing of the interest rate instrument
should be related to is. In other words, is it the case that for the class of rules given
by (2.15) it is optimal to constrain i to be equal to j ?
One limitation of the exercise is that the analysis of alternative rules involving the
explicit use of longer-term rates has been constrained to a selected term structure on
the basis of being the empirically relevant one. However, it might well be the case that
the optimal maturity of the instrument for a given class of rules is actually a 'hidden
maturity'. Despite being an enormous numerical effort, a clearer understanding of
the problem along the maturity dimension might be obtained by conducting the
optimization over interest rates of all maturities.
Many potential avenues for future research are present and this is in my view one
of the main virtues of the paper. In conclusion, the exercise conducted here has pro-
duced clear results. Long-term nominal interest rates can be used in alternative ways
without implying the problems associated with multiple equilibria or non existence of
an equilibrium solution, and under certain circumstances Taylor-type rules that set
a longer-term rate better approximate the optimal outcome.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 The Model
The economy is populated by three types of agents: a representative infinitely lived
household, a continuum of firms, and a monetary authority. The representative house-
hold owns labor inputs and firms, implying that wages and profits are paid to them.
Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive market and are subject to the pres-
ence of price stickiness. Factor markets are assumed to be competitive and goods are
assumed to be produced with a constant returns to scale technology. The monetary
authority's sole function is to control the money supply through positive or negative
transfers of money to households.
2.7.2 The Representative Household
The representative household enters period t with a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds
of different maturities, {Bi,t-l}~l , with prices at the beginning of the period given
by {qi-l,t}i=l ,and money balances M t- 1 . According to this notation Bi,t denotes the
number of nominal zero-coupon bonds at period t with i periods to maturity. A
single bond Bi,t promises to pay one dollar at the end of period t + i-I. The market
price at t of such a bond is denoted qi,t. Notice that the appropriate market price
at the beginning of t for a bond purchased in the previous period, Bi,t-l, is qi-l,t
,since one period has passed since the bond was originally purchased. The yield to
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maturity in the case of zero-coupon bonds is equal to the interest rate on that bond,
Ri,t. Alternatively the yield to maturity is that number which discounts the future
payment (one dollar) to the price of the bond today. Formally we have,
1
qi,t = (R. )i
1",t
During the period the agent receives a transfer of money, H t ,from the monetary
authority as well as wages for WtLt , and profits for Qt, from the monopolistically
competitive firms.
With the available funds the agent purchases a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds with
maturities ranging from 1 to n ,{Bi,t}i::l' with prices given by {qi,t}i=l. In addition
the agent decides on, money balances to be held and transferred to the next period,
M t and consumption purchases for a nominal value of PtCt-
Each period the household is subject to the constraint that the uses of funds are
not to exceed the sources of funds. The above assumptions imply that the flow budget
constraint expressed in real terms can be written as follows,
n . ~ M HQ n . M
LBi,t-l qt-l,t + _tLt + --.-!=!. + _t + _t 2: LBi,t qt,t + _t + Ct (A.I)
i=l Pt Pt Pt Pt Pt i=l Pt Pt
The agent, therefore, chooses a time path for {Ct , L t,M t, {Bi,t}i::l}~O in order to
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maximize its expected lifetime utility, given by,
00 ( M L 1+TJ)EoL eJ.'g9t f3t In Ct + /'i, In _t -1/;_t-
t=O Pt 1 + TJ
(A.2)
subject to the constraint imposed by (A.I) for all t. The parameters in the utility
function, (A.2), are restricted as follows: 0 < f3 < 1 , K > 0 , rljJ > 0 and TJ > 0 and
gt stands for a preference shock that alters the agent's impatience with size governed
by /lg.
The household first order conditions are given by,
1 Pt
--K-
Ct Mt
~ qi,t
Ct Pt
1 Wt
Ct Pt
eJ-tggt+l Pt 1
f3Et------
eJ-tg9t Pt+l Ct+1
= f3E ( eJ-tg9t +l qi-l,t+l)
t eJ-tggtCt+1 Pt+l
= rljJLi
'r/i = 1, .. , n
(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)
Notice that the set of equations given by (A.4) determines the time t term structure
of nominal interest rates. A first order Taylor series expansion of equation (A.4) for
i ~ 2 around the steady state yields equation (2.3) in the text. When i = 1 equation
(A.4)'s expansion yields equation (2.2) in the text.
In addition, each period the agent solves a static allocation problem in order to
determine how much to purchase of each differentiated good. As pointed out earlier
the economy contains a continuum of firms on the interval [0, 1] which are indexed by
<;. Aggregate demand, yt = Ct , is defined using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator in the
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following way,
[
1 ] ej(e-l)
yt = 1yt(c;)(e-l)/eck
,where e governs the degree of monopolistic competition. The price index associated
with the single composite good is defined as follows,
(A.6)
As a result of expenditure minimization, when the price index for the composite good
is given by the expression above, the demand of firm <; takes the following form,
2.7.3 Firms
yt(c;) = (p~:)) -e yt (A.7)
Firm <; produces good <; using labor according to the following constant returns to
scale teclmology,
(A.8)
where at is an i.i.d. teclmology disturbance. Monopolistic competition in the goods
market implies that labor demand is obtained from cost minimization at a demand-
determined level of output. It is assumed here that factor markets are perfectly
competitive and factor prices perfectly flexible. Hence, the firm's problem yields the
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cost minimization condition given by,
(A.9)
where 8 t stands for real marginal cost and Wt is the nominal wage rate at time t.
Equations (A.7), and (A.9) can be combined to describe period's t real profit for
(A.I0)
Consider the price decision of firms. Following Calvo (1983) I assume that each
period there is a constant probability (1 - 'P) that the firm will be able to adjust
its price, independently of past history. Denote the period's t new price set by lucky
firms by p~. The price index specified in equation (A.6) together with the assumptions
on how price setting opportunities arrive to firms, imply the following law of motion,
_ [ l-e + (1 _ )( n)l-e] l/l-ePt - 'PPt-l 'P Pt (A.ll)
Since with a probability of cpk the new price in period t, p~, will be charged in period
t + k, lucky firms in period t set the price as if they were to be incapable of readjusting
from then on. Lucky firms are subject to the presence of a random disturbance, Vt,
that influences period's t pricing decisions. Formally, lucky firm <; sets p~(<;) by solving
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the maximization problem below,
where Xt stands for the marginal utility of wealth in period t. The first order condition
of the problem yields,
(A.12)
Since the lhs of equation (A.12) does not depend on firm's ~ particular conditions, the
optimal price p~(~) is the same for each lucky firm, and so in equilibrium, all prices
that are set in t are equal to the common price p~. The log-linear version of equation
(A.12) can be combined with the log-linear version of the labor market equilibrium
condition and production function to obtain the new Phillips curve, (2.4), in the text.
2.7.4 The Monetary Authority
Each period the monetary authority injects a quantity of money Ht as a transfer to
households. The total quantity of money in the economy obeys,
If we let et = ~~1 stand for period's t gross growth rate of the money supply,
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then the evolution of real money balances can be described by,
~t Mt- 1
----
ITt Pt-l
where lIt = .J!L is the time t gross inflation rate.
Pt-l
(A.13)
It can be shown that the first order conditions for the household's problem can be
combined to obtain the money demand equation
M t _ C R1,t
- -~ t-----
Pt R1,t - 1
The money market equilibrium condition allows us to express the gross nominal one-
period interest rate as
C Mt-lR - ~tPH
l,t - IT C ~ Mt-l-~ t t+ --t Pt-l
The above expression shows explicitly that the monetary authority can set the short
term interest rate, R1,t, as long as ~t adjusts freely to satisfy the money market
conditions necessary to support a given short term interest rate.
In the standard case it is assumed that the monetary authority conducts monetary
policy by setting the one-period nominal interest rate, R1,t, in response to departures
of current output from its flexible price level, yt - ~n, in response to the current
inflation rate and in response to the previous period short-term nominal interest rate.
Formally, monetary policy is characterized in the standard case by a commitment to
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the following rule
(A.14)
where bt is an i.i.d. shock with a normal distribution N(O, 1) and f(e) is in principle
some non-linear arbitrary reaction function. The log-linear version of equation (A.14)
yields equation (2.5) in the text.
In the case in which monetary policy sets the short term rate in response to
movements in some long-term nominal interest rate as well, the reaction function is
given by,
(A.15)
where h(e) is the non-linear reaction function whose first order expansion yields equa-
tion (2.6) in the text.
Finally in the case in which monetary policy is conducted by setting an instrument
other than the short-term rate, the policy will be given by,
(A.16)
where k(e) is the non-linear reaction function whose first order expansion yields equa-
tion (2.7) in the text.
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2.7.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is an allocation sequence and a sequence of prices satis-
fying the first order conditions from the household maximization problem (A.3), (A.4)
and (A.5), the first order condition from the firm's cost minimization problem (A.9),
the first order condition from the firm's price setting problem (A.12), constraints
(equations (A.I) and (A.8)), market equilibrium conditions, the relevant monetary
policy rule, (A.14), or (A.15), or (A.16) depending on the choice of rule, and the equa-
tions that govern the behavior of the exogenous random processes. These equations
form a nonlinear dynamic stochastic system of equations. For the numerical study
of the model, I rely on log-linear approximations to the model's structural equa-
tions. Lower case, or hat variables stand for percentage deviations from the steady
state34 • The log-linear version of the non-linear system of equations, where variables
34Note of caution: Wt and mt stand for the percentage deviation of the real wage and real money
balances from its steady state value. That is,
Wt log(Wt/Pt) -log(W/p)
mt log(Mt/pt) -log(M/p)
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are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady state values is given by
mt == Ct - f3R1,t
Wt == Yt + TJlt
Wt == mCt + Yt - It
(1 - <p)(l - f3<p)
1ft == mCt + f3Et1ft+l + /lvVt
<p
Yt == Ct
gt == ¢gt-l + Ef
Recall that the output gap is the difference between the current level output and
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the one that would prevail under flexible prices. When prices are flexible the real
marginal cost is constant, implying that its deviation from steady state is zero. One
could use the equations to show that when met = 0 the flexible price level output
is given by yf = at. Hence the output gap is Xt = Yt - at. Using this definition for
the output gap, the system of equations can then be reduced to the one shown in the
paper.
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Figure 1: Critical Contour for type-l rule for R2.
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Figure 2: Critical Contour for type-l rule for Rt.
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Figure 3: Critical Contour for type-! rule for RI2.
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Figure 4: Critical Contour for type-l rule for R20.
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Figure 5: Critical Contour for type-l rule for ~o.
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Figure 6 : Regions ofUniqueness for Type-2 rules. ( a - 6 space)
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Figure 7 : Regions of Uniqueness for Type-2 rules. ( a - T space)
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T hI 1 0 . I T 1a e : 'ptlma 'ype- ru es
w r = 0.1 Optimal Standard Type-1 Rules
Rule Rule R2 R4 R12 R20 R40
Loss 0.9926 1.0032 1.0032 1.0032 1.0032 1.0032 1.0032
wx = 0.1 VarJli 0.1015 0.1147 0.1147 0.1147 0.1147 0.1147 0.1147
Var_x 8.8961 8.8824 8.8824 8.8824 8.8824 8.8824 8.8824
Var_r 0.0150 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031
Loss 2.8191 2.8744 2.8744 2.8744 2.8744 2.8744 2.8744
WX=Y3 Var_pi 0.4574 0.3616 0.3614 0.3614 0.3614 0.3614 0.3614
Var_x 7.0625 7.5377 7.5383 7.5383 7.5382 7.5383 7.5383
Var_r 0.0757 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027
Loss 6.7243 7.5900 7.5900 7.5900 7.5900 7.5900 7.5900
wx=1 VarJli 1.6088 0.8299 0.8299 0.8301 0.8299 0.8299 0.8299
Var_x 5.0405 6.7488 6.7488 6.7486 6.7488 6.7488 6.7488
Var_r 0.7504 0.1130 0.1130 0.1130 0.1130 0.1130 0.1130
Loss 14.2980 19.5110 19.5110 19.5110 19.5110 19.5110 19.5110
wx=3 Var_pi 4.8407 3.7726 3.7726 3.7725 3.7726 3.7726 3.7726
Var_x 3.0422 5.1710 5.1710 5.1711 5.1710 5.1710 5.1710
Var_r 3.3090 2.2525 2.2525 2.2524 2.2525 2.2525 2.2525
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Table 2 : Optimal Type-2 rules ( wr = 0.1 )
wr = 0.1 Optimal Standard Type-2 Rules
Rule Rule R2 R4 R12 R20 R40
Loss 0.1167 0.1180 0.1179 0.1177 0.1182 0.1189 0.1195
wx =0.01 VarJ>i 0.0039 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0033 0.0024 0.0012
Var_x 11.0347 11.2289 11.2218 11.2058 11.1868 11.2659 11.4064
Var_r 0.0252 0.0248 0.0245 0.0244 0.0307 0.0386 0.0423
Loss 0.5287 0.5376 0.5374 0.5370 0.5359 0.5362 0.5377
wx = 0.05 VarJ>i 0.0396 0.0443 0.0440 0.0435 0.0426 0.0433 0.0453
Var_x 9.7381 9.8486 9.8494 9.8505 9.8377 9.8192 9.7952
Var_r 0.0216 0.0094 0.0095 0.0098 0.0138 0.0194 0.0262
Loss 0.9926 1.0032 1.0032 1.0029 1.0028 1.0027 1.0035
wx = 0.1 VarJ>i 0.1015 0.1147 0.1143 0.1134 0.1116 0.1097 0.1110
Var_x 8.8961 8.8824 8.8853 8.8917 8.9075 8.9230 8.9173
Var_r 0.0150 0.0031 0.0031 0.0033 0.0040 0.0063 0.0069
Loss 2.8191 2.8744 2.8752 2.8766 2.8n3 2.8775 2.8778
wx=% VarJ>i 0.4574 0.3616 0.3593 0.3562 0.3556 0.3554 0.3515
Var_x 7.0625 7.5377 7.5472 7.5612 7.5651 7.5662 7.5789
Var_r 0.0757 0.0027 0.0019 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Loss 6.7243 7.5900 7.6189 7.6732 7.7088 7.7089 7.7105
wx=1 Var_pi 1.6088 0.8299 0.7823 0.6832 0.5987 0.6066 0.6135
Var_x 5.0405 6.7488 6.8280 6.9865 7.1101 7.1023 7.0970
Var_r 0.7504 0.1130 0.0872 0.0347 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Loss 14.2980 19.5110 19.8466 20.6461 21.8445 21.9581 22.0236
wx=3 VarJ>i 4.8407 3.7726 3.5856 3.1417 5.8654 6.0786 6.1891
Var_x 3.0422 5.1710 5.3491 5.7716 5.1613 5.1196 5.1001
Var_r 3.3090 2.2525 2.1369 1.8943 4.9512 5.2074 5.3430
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Table 3 : Optimal Type-2 rules ( wr = 1 )
wr= 1 Optimal Standard Type-2 Rules
Rule Rule R2 R4 R12 R20 R40
Loss 0.1280 0.1289 0.1288 0.1287 0.1306 0.1335 0.1366
wx = 0.01 Var_pi 0.0128 0.0129 0.0128 0.0127 0.0156 0.0199 0.0254
Var_x 10.9092 10.9984 10.9958 10.9874 10.9132 10.8553 10.7963
Var_r 0.0062 0.0061 0.0061 0.0061 0.0058 0.0050 0.0032
Loss 0.5375 0.5419 0.5418 0.5415 0.5415 0.5426 0.5440
wx = 0.05 VarJ)i 0.0479 0.0522 0.0520 0.0515 0.0522 0.0549 0.0584
Var_x 9.7043 9.7458 9.7472 9.7488 9.7300 9.7017 9.6733
Var_f 0.0044 0.0024 0.0024 0.0026 0.0028 0.0026 0.0018
Loss 0.9993 1.0047 1.0046 1.0045 1.0044 1.0048 1.0053
wx = 0.1 Var_pi 0.1090 0.1183 0.1181 0.1175 0.1166 0.1175 0.1193
Var_x 8.8679 8.8555 8.8571 8.8607 8.8685 8.8638 8.8538
Var_f 0.0035 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0006
Loss 2.8492 2.8757 2.8762 2.8769 2.8773 2.8778 2.8780
wx=% Var_pi 0.3916 0.3581 0.3572 0.3558 0.3555 0.3509 0.3553
Var_x 7.3225 7.5506 7.5554 7.5629 7.5656 7.5806 7.5684
Var_r 0.0167 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Loss 7.1171 7.6441 7.6601 7.6891 7.7070 7.7098 7.7953
wx=1 Var_pi 1.1005 0.6977 0.6772 0.6367 0.6058 0.6064 0.5047
Var_x 5.7595 6.9144 6.9589 7.0434 7.1011 7.1034 7.2891
Var_f 0.2570 0.0320 0.0240 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015
Loss 16.3987 20.5962 20.8247 21.3184 21.7777 21.7844 21.7845
wx=3 Var_pi 3.0671 1.8028 1.6506 1.2557 0.7568 0.7618 0.7485
Var_x 3.9136 6.0524 6.2104 6.5889 7.0070 7.0075 7.0120
Var_r 1.5907 0.6364 0.5428 0.2960 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Figure 10 : Optimal Policy for Type-2 rules. Maturity trade-off:
Panel A : (wx = 0.1 and wr = 0.1)
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Figure 11 : Comparing type-2 rules: Varying a. (wx = 0.05 Y wr = 0.1)
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Figure 12 : Comparing type-2 rules: Varying 6. (wx = 3 y wr = 0.1)
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